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Readers are reminded that this work is protected by copyright. While they are free to use the ideas expressed 
in it, they may not copy, distribute or publish the work or part of it, in any form, printed, electronic or 
otherwise, except for reasonable quoting, clearly indicating the source. Readers are permitted to make copies, 
electronically or printed, for personal and classroom use.
Even though decreasing political responsibility and improvement in services are not mutually exclusive by 
defi nition, it is diffi cult to see why a decrease in accountability to the public should lead to improvement in 
services for the same public.1
1. Introduction
1. This general report discusses the rule-making power of independent administrative 
agencies (also called “quasi autonomous non-governmental organizations” or, in short, 
“QUANGOs”). The report is based on national reports received from fi fteen countries. All 
contributors are thanked for their co-operation.
2. Very interestingly, the range of national reports allows us to compare various constitutional 
systems:
Presidential or semi-presidential systems (France, US) and parliamentary ones (Belgium, Germany, • 
the Netherlands, Finland);
Republican (US, France, Finland, Israel, Italy, Germany, Greece, Switzerland, Poland, Russia) and • 
monarchies (Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain);
* Session IVD3. National reports received from: Belgium, D. De Roy; Denmark, K. Revsbech; Finland. O. 
Suviranta; France, D. Capitant; Germany, K. Fischer; Greece, S. Zissimopoulos; Italy, G. Franco Ferrari; Japan, 
T. Honda; Israel, G. Seidman; The Netherlands, H. Peters, Ph. Eijlander & R. van Gestel; Poland, Z. Kmieciak; 
Russia, Talapina; Spain, G. García-Alvarez; Switzerland, J. H. Meylan; US, D. Custos.
** My profound gratitude to Christine Larssen, Johanne Poirier and my colleagues from the Centre de droit public 
for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Mr. Roland Drago, President of the working group at the 
conference, as well as to the members of the working group for the discussions at the conference. 
1 M. Beblavy, Understanding the waves of agencifi cation and the governance problems they have raised in 
Central and Eastern European countries, 2(1) OECD Journal on budgeting (2002), specifi cally p. 130.
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Centralized states (France, the Netherlands, Denmark) and more federalized states (such as Belgium, • 
Germany, Switzerland, Spain, United States);
Civilist (France, Belgium, Germany) and case-law systems (US, Israel);• 
EU countries potentially infl uenced by Community law – even if the EU is deemed to have no • 
competences in the matter2 – and non-EU countries (Israel, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, United 
States).
3. In order to avoid an overload of footnotes, the general report does not systematically 
provide specifi c references to national reports. Complementary information has been drawn 
from studies on the subject made in the recent past by the OECD (Les autres visages de la 
gouvernance publique – agences, autorités administratives et établissements publics; Puma, 
La gouvernance des autorités et institutions réglementaires, Revue de l’OCDE sur la gestion 
budgétaire, vol. 2, n° 1).3
 Furthermore, interesting work has been carried out on the European agencies,4 based 
mainly on the draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the European 
regulatory agencies.5 
4. These numerous sources confi rm the absence of any general denomination or defi nition 
for QUANGOs as a whole.6 As stated elsewhere,7 they vary widely in terms of funding, size, 
functions (predominantly policy, service delivery or administration of law and regulations), 
legal form, powers, and, lastly, the rationale for their creation. This report only deals with 
the powers of QUANGOs, and more precisely their potential rule-making power. However, 
such a perspective will require us to consider other aspects, which are relevant for a general 
understanding of our topic. 
 In the fi rst section, the report shows the limited rule-making power of QUANGOs, due 
to the very strict conditions for such a formal recognition. This entitles us to consider the 
institutional position occupied by QUANGOs in a democratic State, somewhere between 
the executive and the legislative branches. The second part deals with this institutional 
2 Some reports note that the EU accession might have had some infl uence on the set-up of QUANGOs: E.g. 
Finland. Also the recognition of the Community law infl uence can be found in the Spanish report. 
3 Add. OECD, Working party on regulatory management and reform, Designing independent and accountable 
regulatory authorities for high quality regulation – Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London, United 
Kingdom, 10-11 January 2005, 236 p.; Rapport de l’offi ce parlementaire d’évaluation de la législation n°404 
(2005-2006) de P. Gélard, fait au nom de l’Offi ce parlementaire d’évaluation de la législation, déposé le 15 juin 
2006, Sénat français, available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-404-2/r05-404-2.html.
4 E.g. Rapport d’information fait au nom de la délégation pour l’Union européenne sur les agences européennes 
par M.-Th. Hermange, Sénat français, s.o. 2005-06, n°58 (in short ‘French Senate report’); add. J. Ziller, 
L’autorité administrative dans l’Union européenne, in L. Burgogne-Larsen & L. Azoulay (ed.), L’autorité de 
l’Union européenne – Actes du Colloque de Rouen du 9 avril 2004 (2005).
5 Brussels, 25.02.2005, COM(2005)59 fi nal; add. Council Regulation (EC) n°58/2003 of 19 December 2002 
laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with the management of Community programmes 
and Communication from the Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, 
Brussels, 11.12.2002, COM(2002) 718 fi nal.
6 Cf. The statements in D. Gill, Signposting the zoo – From agencifi cation to a more principle choice of 
government organisational forms, 2(1) OECD Journal on budgeting 27 (2002). 
7 Id, spec. p. 28.
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articulation, from two distinct angles. Hence, despite the limited nature of the formal rule-
making powers, QUANGOs can use other mechanisms to achieve similar results. Secondly, 
the accountability of the QUANGOs is rarely thoroughly developed. These observations 
will lead to the formulation of a number of questions regarding the further development of 
QUANGOs and their powers by way of conclusion.
2. QUANGOs and Rule-Making Power: a Paradoxical Subject of Research 
5. After explaining why this subject might be seen as a paradox, both sides of the paradox 
will be discussed: QUANGOs will be defi ned (a.) as well as the different acceptations of the 
rule-making power (b.).
 
6. The engulfi ng wave towards the multiplication of QUANGOs, which is sometimes 
assumed, is unclear. 
 As far as the concept is concerned, the defi nition of QUANGOs seems simple enough in 
one repect, and quite complex in another. We are talking about entities that are not part of a 
government ministry; but, on the other hand, they are an alternative way in which to perform 
a service, to perform functions which are governmental in nature.8
 As far as the general trend is concerned, some national reports9 claim that QUANGOs are 
here to stay and that the means they represent in public expenditure makes them impossible 
to overlook. At the European level, recent initiatives suggest clear trends towards more 
agencies.10 Nevertheless, rationalizing attempts in some countries11 requires us to nuance this 
assertion. 
7. Given the lack of a general and coherent system of QUANGOs, one of the main tasks 
of the present report is to provide an analytical framework, an attempt to conceptualize the 
phenomenon.12 This report focuses on the two axes of the title: rule-making power and the 
QUANGOs.
8. The title submitted by the Congress organizers can be addressed as a very logical and 
fundamental question, or as a paradox. The central question is to know whether and how 
8 See, Israeli report.
9 Israeli report.
10 French Senate report, supra note 4, p. 5.
11 In the Netherlands, Werkgroep Verzelfstandigde Organisaties op Rijksniveau, een Erkenbare staat: investeren 
in de overhead (2004), p. 7: this working group advised that most QUANGOs should be abolished; in Finland, 
the increase in QUANGOs is not at all clear.
12 Previous attempts can be found in the various works of the OECD.
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QUANGOs fi t within the democratical framework.13 However, the question is also a paradox 
insofar as it implies the assessment of a classical means of State intervention (rule-making) 
through a relatively new way of organizing the State along the lines of QUANGOs. The 
topic aims to examine how this institution can use “old” or traditional ways of organizing the 
State, supposed to be the monopoly of the traditional executive power, under the well-known 
procedures of accountability. In other words, since QUANGOs refer to an assumed alternative 
means of State intervention,14 we must look at how and why this alternative uses “traditional” 
ruling instruments. 
 The paradox does not only lie in the meeting of old and new, but also in the following:
QUANGOs are alleged to be necessary to solve the problems and weaknesses of the traditional State • 
(e.g. to increase effi ciency in service delivery; to place some decision-making power outside the 
political sphere);
When QUANGOs are set up and need to be really effi cient, they need to have an impact on reality, • 
to become effective. They are thus in such a position of potential power (close to a rule-making 
power or at least with some kind of discretionary power – and the diffi culty in qualifying the real 
extent of the power may be a reason to overestimate it) that they engender suspicion: They are very 
often analyzed through the same perspective as the traditional State organisation, suddenly very 
trustworthy. Hence, the legitimacy of QUANGOs’ intervention is questioned.
9. The following two sections discuss the two sides of this paradox by analysing the concepts 
of QUANGOs on the one hand, and that of rule-making power, on the other.
2.1. Diversity in the QUANGO World: an Alternative in State Organisation which is Lacking 
in Organisation
10. This report has chosen a narrow defi nition of QUANGOs, as it only discusses 
QUANGOs with decision-making power among the whole spectrum of entities outside the 
core of the government and the ministries (consultative bodies, experts, commissions, funding 
bodies, etc.).15 QUANGOs are only one way of organizing the presence of the State in social 
and economic regulation.16 Traditionally, a differentiation in the organization of the State was 
made between ministries, decentralized agencies, public enterprises, private enterprises with 
some kind of functional public service, private associations that regulate some professions or 
sectors.17
13 Thus refrasing the question by M. Lombard, Institutions de régulation économique et démocratie politique, 
2005 A.J.D.A. 530-540.
14  A. Schnick, Les agences à la recherche de principes, in OECD, Les autres visages de la Gouvernance 
publique – Agences, autorités administratives et établissements publics 39 (2002). 
15 Gill, supra note 6, spec. p. 50. 
16 Id, espec. pp. 29 – makes a classifi cation of state institutions.
17 Id, espec. pp. 30.
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11. If QUANGOs are an alternative to traditional ministries, or an “alternative mode of 
delivering services by the State”,18 it is not always easy to assess their full scope among the 
possible alternatives to that traditional organisation. “The rise of agencies is simply the latest 
stage of a never ending process of organisational change and experimentation.”19 No precise 
indication can be found in the legislation or in the system as a whole concerning a fi ne-tuned 
defi nition of QUANGOs. 
12. This alternative way of governing has been used in a wide range of sectors: 
Economic regulation: Federal reserve boards;• 20 interstate commerce commission;21 fi nancial 
overrulers;22 competition sector – horizontal23 or vertical;24
Social regulation: consumer product safety commissions,• 25 labour relations;26
Political regulation / human rights: freedom of speech• 27 or privacy,28 rights of the citizens,29 federal 
election commission;30
Central Banks;• 31
Security-related sectors: food,• 32 the environment,33 public security;34
Research;• 35
Professional autonomic organisation• 36 or self-administration.37 
18 The defi nition is that of the general reporter, but has been drawn from Schinck, supra note 14, p. 37. 
19 A. Schinck, Agencies in search of principles, 2(1) OECD Journal on budgeting 7 (2002).
20 E.g., USA.
21 E.g., USA.
22 E.g., Belgium (Commission bancaire, fi nancière et des assurances); France (Commission des opérations de 
bourse); Poland (Commission for Bank-Supervision).
23 E.g., Japan (Fair Trade Commission); Greece (Hellenic Competition Commission).
24 E.g., Belgium (CREG for gas and electricity).
25 E.g., USA.
26 E.g., Japan (Central Labour Relations Commission and Labour Relations Commission for Seafarers).
27 E.g., France (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel); Denmark (Danish Broadcating Corporation); Poland 
(National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television); Greece (National and Radio Televison Council).
28 E.g., France (Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés); Poland (General Inspectorate for the 
Protection of Personal Data).
29 E.g., France (Médiateur de la République, Défenseur des enfants).
30 E.g., USA.
31 See on the peculiarities of the Euro-zone central banks: Lombars, supra note 13.
32 E.g., Belgium (Agence fédérale pour la sécurité alimentaire).
33 E.g., Japan (Environmental Dispute Coordination Commission). 
34 E.g., France (Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité); Japan (National Public Safety Commission) 
and Public Security Examination Commission). Almost never mentioned in the national reports are the cells on 
fi nancial information set up as a result of FATF’s fi ght against money laundering and since 2003 to prevent the 
fi nancing of terrorism. Some specifi c investigations into the status and the power of such cells can be found in 
International Monetary Fund, Les cellules de renseignements fi nanciers – tour d’horizon (2004).
35 E.g., Denmark (National Environmental Research Institute, Danish National Research Foundation).
36 E.g., Russia.
37 E.g., Germany.
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 11.3 (December 2007), http://www.ejcl.org
6
QUANGOs are used at every level of State administration, with more emphasis on a general 
and national level.38 As a rule, constitutive units in federal states also enjoy the power to set 
up QUANGOs.39 In countries such as the Netherlands, numerous local QUANGOs exist.40
13. The examples illustrate that QUANGOs are an integral part of the organization of 
the State. As such, they should have some kind of constitutional grounding of a more or less 
formal nature. However, constitutions very seldom provide a clear foundation for the creation 
of QUANGOs.41 When it does exist, this formal recognition may be of two kinds: a general 
one, or a more specifi c one which explicitly refers to QUANGOs or lists (some of) them. 
 Finland illustrates the fi rst of these scenarios. The Finnish Constitution grants rule-making 
powers to “other authorities”, in addition to the President, the Government or specifi c 
departments (and the relevant paragraph stipulates the conditions for such a delegation). 
 QUANGOs are expressly provided for in the Greek42 Constitution. In Poland, some 
QUANGOs, such as the National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television, are 
embedded in three articles of the Constitution,43 without any general provision regarding 
QUANGOs as a whole.
 Even in the United States – where these agencies are the most developed –, the 
Constitution does not provide a specifi c foundation for independent regulatory agencies.44 
This being said, legal scholarship unanimously places QUANGOs in the institutional 
framework.
14. Aside from any formal constitutional recognition of QUANGOs, these entities might 
fi nd historical reality in the very way the State is organised. At fi rst sight, this would appear 
38 In Spain, in most cases, QUANGOs exercise their powers in the state as a whole, but certain exceptions, such 
as “autonomic independent entities”, do exist.
39 E.g., Belgium, Switzerland, Germany.
40 E.g., also a few of them at the local level in Denmark.
41 No constitutional basis: E.g., Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, USA, Germany, Japan, Spain.
42 As well as a non-limited list of 5 QUANGOs (Hellenic Data Protection Authority, National Radio and 
Television Council, Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection, Greek Ombudsman, Confi dentiality of 
Communications Authority).
43
Article 213: (1) The National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television shall safeguard the freedom 
of speech, the right to information as well as safeguard the public interest regarding radio broadcasting and 
television.
(2) The National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television shall issue regulations and, in individual 
cases, adopt resolutions.
The only other QUANGO with a form of rule-making power is also laid down in the Polish Constitution (namely the Council 
for Monetary Policy).
44 Art. I, Sec. 8 , cl. 18 of the US Constitution reads:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this constitutions in the government of the 
United states, or in any department or offi cer thereof.
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to place them on safer ground than in systems where QUANGOs were “added” at a latter 
stage in the institutional architecture. Indeed, in countries like the United States or Finland, 
QUANGOs have been part of the institutional set-up for a long time. 
 Hence, QUANGOS have existed in the United States since the late 19th century, “in 
connection with the expansion of the administrative hold over the economy, agencies, 
singularly independent agencies, became the favorite recipients of the law-making authority. 
They emerged at the end of the 19th century as essential instruments of discipline of 
free enterprise, in the name of public interest”. However, some issues (such as the exact 
relationship between the President and QUANGOs) remain the subject of controversy.
 Finland has also had QUANGOs for a long time, but the “position of national 
administrative agencies in the administrative machinery is not linear.”45 However, the opinion 
that the agencies were independent fi rst developed in legal literature in the beginning of the 
20th century, as a “defense against the strengthening Czarist rule in Finland at the end of the 
19th century – the central administrative boards were for the most part led by Finnish men … 
.” The current position of the agencies dates back to 1913 with the interpretation by a leading 
scholar of administrative law. According to K.J. Ståhlberg, administrative authorities were 
independent not only with regard to authorities on the same level, but even with regard to 
superior authorities. As a rule – and as is the case in most countries – the superior authority 
does not have the power to take action in matters falling within the competence of subordinate 
authorities. This new Ståhlbergian way of describing the position of administrative authorities 
was taken as a starting point when drafting the Constitutional Act (1919) for the independent 
republic. However, this Act says very little regarding the position of administrative agencies. 
The Ståhlbergian description was gradually adopted in practice and in the legal literature. 
Starting from the 1940s, this view was predominant. 
 More recently, Japan also enshrined QUANGOs in its post-World War II Constitution.46 
The system of Commissions, one of the Japanese kinds of QUANGOs, was introduced by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers after World War II. They were modelled on the 
independent regulatory commissions of the United States. Their purpose was to ensure a form 
of democratic administration. 
45 In and around the 1980s most of the traditional national administrative agencies were eliminated. In the 1990s, 
however, it became clear that in many fi elds there was a need for national administrative agencies with “hard” 
administrative and even regulatory powers. The fact that Finland became a member of the European Union in 
1995 was not of minor importance in this context.
46 Elaborated nearly in the same circumstances, the German Constitution did not choose the same organisation, 
while it copied the competition system of the United States where QUANGOs are most used.
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15. Even in the absence of historical development, QUANGOs have also been put in 
place in order to respond to various crises or at least to respond to specifi c problems.47 At 
the European level, the EFSA48 was set up as a reaction to the ESB crisis. In Belgium, one 
can fi nd the following examples: Commission bancaire et fi nancière in the aftermarth of the 
1929 – fi nancial crash; AFSCA49 following a wide dioxine crisis in1999. In Japan, as well, 
a series of fi nancial scandals involving major securities “houses” led to the creation of new 
institutions in 1991 [Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) and Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA)]. Following some reorganization in the late 1990s, these can be 
qualifi ed as QUANGOs.50
 In these examples, reactions to the various crises were prompt, but they did not include any 
real conceptual refl exion concerning the constitutional requirements for setting up those new 
entities.
16. Since constitutions may be very vague regarding the legality of QUANGOs, the 
foundations for their creation must be found in the constitutional exercise of powers. Often, 
constitutions provide that powers fl ow from the Nation (or the people) and that the powers 
can only be exercised in accordance with the constitution, which grants some powers to the 
Legislature and the Executive, but none to the QUANGOs.51 As a result, QUANGOs have 
to be set up by a specifi c legislative act,52 the legislative branch being entitled to provide a 
framework for the QUANGOs53 either on a case-by-case basis or in a general statute. The 
requirement of a legal basis for QUANGOs seeks to “prevent different public administrative 
fi elds from diffusing and detaching themselves from the hierarchically democratic controlling 
mechanisms.”54 The legislative act might contain various information about the regime 
47 For striking examples of the use of QUANGOs as a way of responding to specifi c problems, See, Rapport 
public 2001 du Conseil d’Etat, Les autorités administratives indépendantes, la Documentation française, n° 52, 
2001, pp. 261 and f.
48 European Food Safety Authority.
49 Agence fédérale pour la sécurité de la chaîne alimentaire.
50 Also the FSA and the SESC were the result of those scandals. The Japanese report underlines that such 
reorganization might be caused by the globalization of fi nance.
51 E.g., Belgium; Germany:
In taking a closer look at the Court’s statement, its background becomes clear: it is derived from the basic 
democratic principle in Art. 20 II 2 GG, which states that all power in the state is held by the people. The 
Court deduces from this principle that any governmental activity with decision-making characteristics must 
require democratic legitimation …; parliamentary elections put the power of the people into practice …, and 
it is the election which legitimates the formation of the government. The power of the government to give 
instructions to the subordinated administrative authorities forms the continuation of this legitimation chain.
 
52 Finland: but the extent of the content of the general principles that should be laid down in Acts of parliament 
is unsure; in France, it remains unsure whether the Executive may create a QUANGO (Gélard, supra note 3, pp. 
28 and f.); in some cases in Denmark, an authorization in the State Budget has been enough (for the state-owned 
company delivering natural gas, oil and electricity to customers there).
53 Belgium, France, the Netherlands, US, Spain, Germany.
54 German Report.
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applicable to QUANGOs, and it may provide that the entity will have some rule-making 
power. In many countries, this legal basis is mandatory.55 The extent of the specifi cations in 
the Act of Parliament is generally clearly established: the name, powers (even in the USA, 
interpretation is necessary), the main tasks, composition, … 
17. In practice, very few of the countries studied here have general rules regarding 
QUANGOs.56 The main examples of such general rules are from the United States (1946 
Administrative Procedure Act, as the basis for the Independent and the Executive Agencies) 
and from the Netherlands (where a recent draft is pending). But elsewhere, the legal 
requirements are very vague, various, depending on one case to another.
 The legal status of the QUANGOs also varies widely. In almost every case, QUANGOs 
do have specifi c legal personality,57 very often considered as being the key to their 
independence.58 But the legal regime is very different from QUANGO to QUANGO, and 
from State to State.59 
The distinction between public law and private law bodies is not meant to imply that each body will be 
completely in one of these legal jurisdictions. For example, private law bodies can be incorporated under 
private law but still may be created by statute and subject to the budget law or administrative law with respect 
to the exercise of certain administrative powers. Similarly, public law bodies may be subject to private law 
(and treated as separate legal entities for those purposes) when conducting certain transactions with third 
parties (entering leases, etc).60 
18. Given this lack of common foundation, legal literature and case law are of particular 
importance. First of all, they establish the boundaries of the use of QUANGOs.61 Secondly, 
they specify the general characteristics and the scope of QUANGOs’ powers. In France, 
the qualifi cation of QUANGOs has been provided through legislative acts, case law or 
doctrine. In Belgium, the notion is developed mainly in the doctrine (in the non-binding 
“legisprudence”62 of the Conseil d’Etat). The Belgian report pinpointed some characteristics 
which have been developed by legal doctrine (the executive function, specialisation, 
powers specifi c to the “puissance publique”, and independence). It might also explain 
why some national reports focused on specifi c QUANGOs without any generalisation or 
conceptualisation of the global regime, as is the case with Spain, for instance.
55 E.g., Germany, Finland.
56 Nothing in Belgium, France, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Israël, Denmark.
57 The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain; Contra: Poland; in France, the lack of legal personality is seen 
as a requirement for the independence of QUANGOs (See, Lombard, supra note 13).
58 Israel.
59 Mostly public law in Belgium; mostly private law in Russia; mixed depending on the case in Denmark. 
60 Gill, supra note 6, espec. p. 43. 
61 Finland. 
62 This is the name given to the practice of the Council of State when it provides advice on draft legislation. 
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 Due to the lack of legislative precision surrounding QUANGOs, it might be very diffi cult 
to qualify a body as such and which may have a number of consequences for their legal 
regime. Certain systems try to solve the issue of poor visibility in various ways. In France, 
the Conseil d’Etat set up a list of ‘autorités administratives indépendantes’ in 2002, as did 
Parliament in 2006. However, the list does not appear to be updated on a systematic basis. In 
the Netherlands, a QUANGO register has been set up for QUANGOs existing at the national 
level (but, according to the doctrine, this is only “the tip of the iceberg”): No such register 
exists for local QUANGOs. 
19. At this stage of the report, it appears that in many cases the very object of the research 
is rather vague. For the sake of clarity, the report will henceforth discuss entities which lie 
outside the classic departmental organisation of the State, and which have decision-making 
power. 
2.2. Variation in Rule-Making Power 
20. Any attempt at defi ning rule-making power must start with a comparison of the 
‘pouvoir réglementaire’ (2.2.1). Once the content of the notion has been explained, the 
consequences of the use and control of this power have to be underlined (2.2.2). The rule-
making power of the QUANGOs can then be outlined (2.2.3). 
2.2.1. The Concept of Rule-Making and the Balance of Power
21. There are different approaches to the concept of ‘rule-making’. The fi rst is to compare 
‘regulatory’ and ‘rule-making’ power. The second is to point out the difference between 
‘regulation’ and ‘rule-making’ power. A third approach is to decompose the power along a 
continuum, from formal ‘regulatory’ power to ‘informal’ power, through participation in the 
elaboration of ‘réglements’. 
22. Two main conceptions of rule-making power exist. The fi rst one, the French, refers to 
the power to issue ‘règlements’, which constitute general, abstract, impersonal and binding 
norms. The second conception states that rule-making is the carrying out of general policy, as 
opposed to “adjudication”, used for administrative action affecting individual rights.63 In this 
sense, the American report discusses the rule-making power as follows:
the rulemaking power may be defi ned as the authority to issue rules or regulations […]. According to the 
American administrative law, a rule is “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
63 American report.
11
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applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” […]. From a 
comparative standpoint, besides the confusing mention of ‘particular applicability’64 this defi nition sounds 
familiar due to its reference to the impersonal and prospective character of rulemaking.
Less familiar to the comparative mind is the encompassing nature of the American defi nition of rulemaking. 
As a matter of fact, rulemaking describes not only the binding law-making power of agencies but also a 
non-binding component of their normative power which in other legal systems such as French administrative 
law are clearly excluded from the rulemaking sphere.65 To this effect, the administrative American law 
distinguishes between, on the one hand, legislative rules which modify the legal landscape and are binding, 
on the other hand, non legislative rules which do not have the force and effect of the law.
Irrespective of these nuances, rule-making implies a decision made by the entity in order to 
make some choices, even if it is only within a very narrow margin. This decision can shape an 
individual position or have a wider scope through the setting of standards, guidelines, good 
practices, policy rules, recommendations, advice, initiatives.
 Because the notion of “rule-making” in American law is very wide, the challenge for other 
countries is then to draw a line between rule-making power and regulation, when needed. The 
distinction between rule-making power and regulation implies that regulatory agencies are 
not, as such, QUANGOs.66 At least, there is no systematic link between both. Some national 
reports have tried to keep a narrow defi nition of the rule-making power,67 but on the whole the 
reports have tended to discuss a broader concept of rule-making.68 Here are the most striking 
attempts in this direction:
Discussing the regulatory powers of Dutch QUANGOs, one easily runs the risk of mixing up different 
concepts of regulation and rule-making. […] In the Netherlands a defi nition of regulation usually covers 
more than just the promulgation of (generally binding) rules. In the context of government policy and 
public services, regulation is normally considered to be the control of something by rules, as opposed to its 
prohibition. In this respect, regulation is not limited to rule-making. It is also about licensing, inspection and 
enforcement, and sometimes even dispute resolution. In relation to market failure, regulation is normally the 
opposite of deregulation and liberalization. Regulation in this sense includes setting standards that determine 
the “rules of the game” on markets for public services. As far as administrative law is concerned, regulation 
is in some countries narrowly defi ned as the legal restrictions promulgated by administrative agencies in 
contrast to statutory law or case law. This paper deals with regulation in a broader sense.69
The French report takes another approach to extend the rule-making power:
64 For Continental European scholars and the Administrative Conference of the US, the mention of ‘particular 
applicability’ sounds erroneous because of the general norm associated with rule-making.
65 For instance, the defi nition of the French rule-making power includes only what in the US is referred to as 
legislative rule-making.
66 This is pointed out in the Belgian report. See, J. L. Autin, Les autorités de régulation sont-elles des autorités 
administratives indépendantes?, in Environnements: les mots du droit et les incertitudes de la modernité: 
Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Jean-Philippe Colson (2004), pp. 439-450; Lombard, supra note 13, spec. 
p. 532.
67 E.g., the Belgian report tends to study individual and regulatory powers, but rejects a broader sense of 
rule-making; the Swiss report tries to explain the various defi nitions of ordinances, but after a very thorough 
distinction, the report then focuses on a narrow approach.
68 E.g., France, the Netherlands.
69 Dutch report. Under French law, the following defi nition of regulation can be found
organizer ex ante un secteur ou une organization, soit d’une façon générale (à travers le pouvoir 
réglementaire), soit d’une façon particulière à travers des droits d’accès à une activité, soit au bénéfi ce de 
personne (par l’agrément ou l’autorisation), soit au bénéfi ce de biens ou d’activités (par la certifi cation, ou 
l’accréditation)
(Gélard, supra note 3, p. 91).
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Le pouvoir réglementaire des autorités administratives indépendantes peut connaître des formes multiples. 
C’est d’abord le pouvoir réglementaire classique d’exécution des lois dont dispose normalement l’exécutif 
qui peut leur être attribué de manière expresse […]. Au-delà de ce pouvoir réglementaire exprès fi nalement 
assez limité, les autorités administratives indépendantes connaissent des formes plus complexes de l’exercice 
du pouvoir réglementaire, qu’il s’agisse de démembrements de celui-ci […] ou que ce soit à travers l’exercice 
de leur pouvoir d’adopter des décisions individuelles qu’elles élaborent de véritables normes […].
23. Rule-making power can be autonomous (i.e. fl owing from a general competence 
and without a specifi c legislative act having to be implemented) or a power to execute or 
implement a legislative act. To put it simply, from a traditional perspective,70 control is linked 
to the separation of powers. Parliament fulfi ls an important task of controlling the activities 
of the Executive. More specifi cally, as Parliament is the instigator of laws and one of the 
means for the Executive to implement the laws is its regulatory power, it seems logical that 
Parliament controls the use of this regulatory power, as well as the other activities of the 
Government. The issue is to check that the general interest is observed in accordance with the 
people’s will (or the Nation’s will).
 As such, the regulatory power is not on an equal footing with individual decision-making. 
However, two points can be made. 
 First, the Executive branch has a large margin of discretion71 in the use of regulatory power 
and the consequences thereof can have a signifi cant impact on a nation’s life and will structure 
all the subsequent decisions taken at an individual level. However, some authors argue72 
that the risks generated by a discretionary regulatory power are not that important given the 
nature of this power, which is to be applied on an impersonal basis. This should encourage the 
Executive power to remain neutral, as it does not know in advance who will be affected by the 
rules.
 Secondly, individual decisions can also be subject to discretionary power, but increasingly, 
ever more constraints accompany individual decisions. For instance, in Belgium, individual 
decisions are subject to the marginal control of the courts (i.e. the court checks whether the 
public body has behaved as a careful body would have done) and suffi cient grounds for these 
decisions have to be formally provided.73 But this general obligation to provide suffi cient 
grounds is less developed for a ‘règlement’. This is because the decision can be well reasoned 
by means of a general discussion before Parliament. 
70 J. Gicquel, Présentation, in Contrôle parlementaire et évaluation, La Documentation française 31-32 (1995).
71 The criterion of “discretionary power” is also the one used at the European level in the “Meroni Doctrine” 
(European Court of Justice, vol. V (1958), 11 ff. & 53 ff).
72 French report. 
73 Cf. Åarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (25 June 1998), art. 6 (individual decisions): developed mandatory motivation 
vs. art. 7 & 8 (general norms): a very soft obligation to provide suffi cient grounds for decisions.
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2.2.2. The Rule-Making Power of QUANGOs
24. Every State seems to experience some diffi culties in the recognition of the rule-making 
powers of QUANGOs, or at least to outline very strict conditions for the recognition of such 
powers. One notable exception is the United States (where QUANGOs are called ‘IRAs’). 
The American report states:
The source of the IRAs’ rulemaking power is legislative. Each enabling statute assigns a specifi c set of 
powers to a given agency. A grant of rulemaking power does not exist in every governing statute and even 
though it elects to confer rulemaking power, Congress may choose to vest only a power to make rules with no 
force of law, otherwise known as non-legislative rules. 
However, the delegation may cover the entire range of the IRAs’ mission or may consist in specifi c grants of 
authority […]. Moreover, the wide spread of rulemaking does not necessarily derive from a clear delegatory 
congressional intent. In fact, Congress has very often employed ambiguous language, vaguely referring to the 
authority to promulgate rules and regulations, which potentially may or may not be binding […]. Faced with 
the determination of the extent of the delegation […], since the 1970s, courts tend to presume […] that such a 
language conveys the intent to confer a legislative rulemaking power. With such a presumption, the post-APA 
case-law favors a generalization of the delegation of legislative power.
The last part of the cited report is very important: in case of doubt, the presumption is to 
recognize a rule-making power, while all other national reports underline a strict interpretation 
of the powers of QUANGOs.
25. The other countries try to be pragmatic74 insofar as most of the various conditions 
are laid down for the recognition of some rule-making powers, in accordance with the 
constitutional framework. Two elements are recurrent: The requirement of a legislative basis 
for the recognition of rule-making power,75 as well as the publication of the norm issued by 
QUANGOs in an offi cial journal.76 These conditions apply to the recognition of rule-making 
power in general. We do not purport to look in detail at every national system as some of them 
might have specifi c rules depending on the QUANGOs in question. However, two main kinds 
of constraints can be distinguished: requirements which focus on the object or the nature of 
the rule, and requirements which relate to the effect of the norms. A combination thereof is 
also possible.77 Furthermore, both approaches might achieve a similar result in some cases.
2.2.2.1. The object of the rules 
26. The constraints related to the objective of the power are expressed in different ways. 
In some countries the norms 
74 Cf. statement in the Belgian report.
75 Japan, Finland, the Netherlands, France.
76 E.g., Greece, Japan, Spain, Finland, the USA; in Belgium, publication in the Moniteur belge is not required for 
every règlement (under the Conseil supérieur de l’Audiovisuel, for instance), which results in many questions 
arising. 
77 E.g., Switzerland.
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 11.3 (December 2007), http://www.ejcl.org
14
Must be limited to technical matters:• 78 no defi nition of technical matters is provided, which entails a 
degree of interpretation;79
have a limited scope,• 80 the matter being precisely defi ned, thus excluding any ‘blank cheque’:81 this 
is meant to prevent the Legislature82/Executive83 from losing power in favour of QUANGOs;84
Must be limited to specifi c cases or suffi cient grounds must be provided;• 85
C• annot breach the general constitutionnal and legal framework: In practice, this translates, in a 
number of ways, into the requirement of ministerial control (approbation or amendement, initiative)86 
or subordination to the regulatory power of the Prime Minister.87 In Switzerland, it means that the 
requirement of a referendum cannot be bypassed. This means that when those referendum procedures 
are open, they have to be respected and that no power can be delegated to QUANGOs.
27. As the rules are subject to interpretation by the QUANGOs, the following conclusions of 
a recent Dutch research project are not surprising. Hence, 
The researchers discovered 153 (clusters of) QUANGOs, from which about 40% (61) are entitled to enact 
rules on the basis of a statutory law. Within this group of 61, 39 refer to rule-making in special cases, and 
are therefore in need of ministerial approval. An example of the sort of regulatory authority we are talking 
about here, are the regulations that concern the provision of subsidies. In 30% of the cases where ministerial 
approval was obliged, such an approval did not exist in practice. Perhaps even more alarming, however, is the 
fact that 40% of the total number of QUANGOs claim to have regulatory powers, while in reality they do not 
possess such powers or vice versa. 
 A possible explanation for this confusion is the rather complicated distinction that exists in Dutch 
administrative law between policy rules and generally binding regulations. On the outside, both look very 
much alike (general formulation, suited for repeated application, aimed at an indefi nite number of addressees 
etcetera). Nevertheless, policy rules are based on an executive power, while generally binding regulations 
always have to be based on a specifi c delegation of legislative power by an Act of Parliament, or otherwise 
be founded on a direct attribution by the constitution. A mix up is easily made when the legislator leaves a 
margin of appreciation for agencies to interpret open-ended clauses in the law. QUANGOs often fi ll in this 
margin by setting technical standards for the benefi t of a consistent application of the law. These standards, 
however, are the derivative of the power to implement and execute statutory laws. They do not arise from an 
autonomous lawmaking power.
78 Belgium, Greece, Japan, France:
son champ d’intervention est limité en principe à des objets techniques dans lesquels il vient simplement 
préciser le cadre plus général fi xé par les lois et règlements;
il s’agit avant tout d’un pouvoir réglementaire de nature technique qui permet à ces autorités de préciser des 
règles dont elles sont par ailleurs chargées de contrôler l’application par des régimes d’autorisation, par des 
pouvoirs de règlement des différends ou encore par des pouvoirs de sanction.
 
79 Dutch report; in the Netherlands a regulatory power is only conferred on QUANGOs “as far as it concerns 
organizational and technical matters.”
80 France: In the case law of the Conseil constitutionnel, two conditions are laid down «cette habilitation ne peut 
en tout état de cause concerner “que des mesures de portée limitée tant par leur champ d’application que par leur 
contenu.”
81 Finland: “No open-ended or vague authorisations are allowed.”
82 Switzerland:
il ne saurait non plus, par un simple ‘blanc-seing’, lui abandonner entièrement le soin de régler une matière, 
même relativement bien circonscrite. Sur ce point, cependant, la jurisprudence, […], fait preuve d’une 
certaine souplesse: il n’est pas possible de défi nir une fois pour toutes ni ce qui constitue, ou non, une 
réglementation d’une importance telle qu’elle ne puisse être instaurée que par une loi au sens formel, ni le 
degré de détail que doit revêtir la norme de délégation; tout est affaire de circonstance.
  
83 Belgium: “La conséquence en est que l’attribution de ce pouvoir ne peut être conçue qu’en termes spécifi ques 
et donc être complète, précise et limitée.”
84 Swizerland; the Netherlands. 
85 Finland: “There must be a special reason for the authorisation pertinent to the subject-matter under regulation. 
Such special reasons are very often connected with special professional features of the activities to be regulated.”
86 Belgium (as a rule); in the Netherlands (in specifi c cases).
87 France.
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2.2.2.2. The effect of the rule
28. In some systems, a rule issued by a QUANGO cannot have any impact on the rights 
of the individual.88 Regulations which have serious legal implications for the operators or can 
create rights and duties for citizens are likely to be issued by competent authorities such as the 
Cabinet, the head of the Cabinet Offi ce or ministers.89 In Finland, as a general limitation to the 
rule-making powers of administrative authorities, according to the Constitution, all principal 
rules on the rights and duties of private individuals must be laid down in an Act of Parliament. 
 In Switzerland, when some autonomous regulatory power is recognized, for instance for 
the so-called ‘entités prestataires de services’, this power is always subject to a limitation 
when its content could impact on the fundamental rights of the users.
29. In short, as many national reports have stated, and with the exception of the USA, the 
rule-making powers of QUANGOs are marginal. This very limited recognition also concerns 
the other powers of the QUANGOs and also applies to the small number of QUANGOs with 
some rule-making power.90 
3. QUANGOs and Rule-Making Power: the Logic Behind the Balance between Autonomy 
and Control? 
30. The topic of the ‘rule-making power of the QUANGOs’ is not only a paradox: No 
rule lays down that a ‘new’ institution has to use new instruments. Furthermore, the question 
surrounding the balance between autonomy and control is also a logical question insofar as it 
is a way of studying the institutional location of the QUANGO in a democratic framework, 
somewhere in between the Executive and the Legislature. Indeed, beyond the diversity of the 
phenomenon, questions regarding QUANGOs’ rule-making powers can be studied from the 
perspective of the fundamental balance between autonomy and accountability.
 One can assess the autonomy of QUANGOs by analysing the controls to which they are 
subject. However, the power of rule-making is only the tip of the iceberg. As regulatory power 
is normally formally well defi ned in a democratic State (its exercise, source, limits, control), a 
priori this topic appears less vague than an examination of the competences of QUANGOs. 
The fi rst section discusses the specifi c place of the QUANGOs by means of three models, 
on the basis of the formal and legal framework.91 Each of those three patterns are based on 
88 E.g., Denmark. 
89 Japan. 
90 E.g., Poland (only one QUANGO with clear rule-making powers, the National Council of Radio Broadcasting 
and Television, an organ of state control and for defending certain fundamental rights); a similar situation exists 
in Greece.
91 Other studies have categorized QUANGOs on economic or political grounds.
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a specifi c balance between autonomy and control. Those models are highly theoretical and 
arbitrary, as is any attempt to categorize. Beyond the wide diversity of QUANGOs, the aim 
is to highlight some characteristics of QUANGOs through their internal workings (structure, 
organization) as well as their external workings (relationships with the other powers, 
accountability, …). Every explanation should be read with a benevolent eye, knowing that 
each specifi c QUANGO or national system shows a range of possibilities, resulting in many 
exceptions to what is said. The sketch presented should be seen like a painter’s palette. Each 
single QUANGO has a touch of each element, some more overwhelming than others, as some 
examples will illustrate. The merit of this presentation is to stress that there is no single model 
of QUANGOs, but several questions that need to be addressed in accordance with the legal, 
social and historical context of each State.
 The second section provides a more complete picture, through the judicial review that 
might be infl uenced by the position of QUANGOs in the democratic framework (section 3.2). 
3.1. The Relationship between the Parliamentary and Executive Decision-Making Power, 
Particularly with Regard to the Rule-Making Power of QUANGOs
31. The following paragraphs will focus on the autonomy and the independence92 of 
QUANGOs towards the Executive and the Legislative branches. In order to gain a precise 
image of such a relationship, it is important to present the various logics at work by the 
creation of QUANGOs. This will cast some light on the autonomy of QUANGOs and the 
mechanisms binding the Executive and the Legislature concerning QUANGOs. The study 
will then address the tools available to QUANGOs in their attempt to fulfi l their tasks. Those 
powers lead to the question of the accountability of QUANGOs.
Trends – 
Reasons for 
QUANGOs
Scope of 
autonomy 
Kinds of 
competences
Accountability Consequences for 
the Executive / 
Government
Neutrality Independence 
and 
specialisation 
of manpower 
and 
QUANGOs
Not 
necessarily 
the three 
powers
Towards 
Parliament directly
Less Governmental 
power
Pragmatism Every means 
necessary to 
achieve the 
goals are up to 
QUANGOs
All three 
powers
Through ministerial 
responsability to 
Parliament.
Homologation 
of the acts by the 
Ministers
Enhancing the State’s 
abilities.
Either the Government 
has the means to 
control the QUANGOs, 
and its power may be 
reinforced.
Or it lacks them 
92 On the differences between both concepts: Gill, supra note 6, spec. pp. 65-66. Add. Autin, supra note 66, pp. 
439-450.
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Governance Broad 
autonomy 
All three 
powers
‘extended 
accountability’
- towards 
Parliament & 
Executive
- towards the sector 
and / or public
Specifi c power in itself, 
having its own place, 
counterbalancing the 
Executive
Theoretical approach of QUANGOs’ diversity 
3.1.1. Reasons for Setting up QUANGOs
32. After a specifi c crisis (for instance ESB) or a more general legitimacy question,93 
one way to restore the trust of citizens and the credibility of the State institutions is to 
create QUANGOs. The idea is to build this credibility on different pillars, like the expertise 
of the new empowered entity, the means given to it or the promoted transparency. I will 
discribe three main trends, the fi rst one can be called the neutrality logic, the second one the 
pragmatism and the last one the Governance logic.94
 QUANGOs play various and not exclusive roles in the balance of powers between the 
Legislature and the Executive. The creation of QUANGOs can lead to a limitation in the 
concentration of powers by the Government. However, the emphasis could also be placed 
on practical reasons leading to an improvement in the services provided by the State and, 
on an indirect basis, the extension of governmental presence in society. Finally, in some 
systems, QUANGOs have their own place, and are sometimes qualifi ed as a ‘fourth power’.95 
However, the characteristics of QUANGOs are intertwined with each other and some reports 
illustrate this in a striking way.
33. QUANGOs can be set up in order to isolate important functions of the State from 
political96 or sectoral infl uences, or a potential confl ict of interests. This confl ict may have 
different origins, depending on the fi elds in which the QUANGO is used. The following 
examples are often given:
93 The French report asks the following question
Le développement de ce type d’institutions ne marque-t-il pas une méfi ance générale au regard de la manière 
dont les objectifs d’intérêt public sont pris en charge par les institutions gouvernementales et administratives 
classiques qui constituent l’exécutif?
 
94 For another categorizations, See, Gill, supra note 6, spec. pp. 30 and f.: economy (freeing from civil service 
controls and from administrative procedures); effi ciency (focus and single tasking); effectiveness (fl exible and 
customer friendly, value of a governance board); or legitimacy (separation of powers, promoting the involvement 
of experts and wider civil society, distancing politicians from certain decisions).
95 E. Zoller, Les agences fédérales américaines, la régulation et la démocratie, 2004 R.F.D.A.  spec. 758.
96 E.g., Japan.
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The economic sector where the State was previously in a monopolistic position. In that case, the State • 
in itself could have some ‘personal’ interest in the decisions that it takes. Typically, such confl icts of 
interest arise when the State remains a major economic actor in one liberalized sector;97
A relationship where the State risks not being neutral or impartial towards citizens (the citizens-State • 
relationship);98
Political fi eld: Election Committee• 99 or Committee on access to the media or to the body which 
broadcasts the news.100 In such cases, the politicians in power could have a great interest in barring 
their opponents from accessing the media or in disturbing the electoral process. 
To prevent such confl ict of interests, committees are set up, whose manpower are free from 
any political and/or sectoral links. They are chosen for their independence and expertise. 
This should preclude too much concentration of power in the hands of the Executive. In other 
words, specialisation is a way to protect the general interest against biased decisions. 
 The French report summarises this consideration in the following terms: 
il s’agit alors de dépolitiser l’exercice de certaines fonctions étatiques […]. Le fait de confi er une politique 
particulière à une autorité administrative indépendante permet en outre d’assurer une étanchéité de celle-ci au 
regard des autres politiques publiques. […]
 Dans ces différents domaines, le développement d’une administration polycentrique permet d’introduire 
un élément de séparation des pouvoirs au sein même de l’administration, d’établir des checks and balances 
rendus nécessaires par la concentration des pouvoirs au profi t de l’exécutif.
Likewise, the Dutch report states that:
QUANGOs could serve an important role in the balancing of powers between the executive and the 
legislative competences of Dutch Ministers. Transferring certain executive powers to QUANGOs might even 
prevent abuses of power by Ministers in cases where there is a possible confl ict of interests between their 
administrative and political roles.
The American report also sheds some light on this issue: 
Originally […], the independent agency symbolized the vesting in idealized […] experts of regulatory powers 
over the economy that challenged the common law notions of property and contractual freedom in the name 
of the public interest. It contrasted with the executive agency which theoretically was confi ned to managerial 
tasks […] and could not venture into decision making as far-reaching and encompassing as congressional 
action. Accordingly, it was termed the independent regulatory agency.
The interest in the following quotation lies the footnote after “idealized”: “They were 
idealized in that they were presumed to resort to science and be insulated from the failings of 
politics.”
97 E.g., France.
98 Rapport Conseil d’Etat, supra note 47, p. 275; France: le Médiateur de la République ou la Commission 
d’accès aux documents administratifs.
99 Dutch report:
An example is the position of the Electoral Council. This council advises the Dutch government and both 
Houses of Parliament on practical matters relating to elections or questions of franchise. The Council also 
acts as the central polling station in parliamentary elections and elections to the European Parliament. […] It 
is probably wise that the Minister for the Interior in the Netherlands cannot give specifi c instructions to the 
board when it comes to topics such as: setting the date for new elections or determining the validity of the list 
of candidates for the various political parties. Otherwise, possible confl icts of interest between the Minister as 
a representative of the Crown, and as a representative for his political party, lie in wait.
 
100 E.g.: Denmark, Italy, France.
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 A limitation of the Executive can also be found in Finland for historical reasons dating 
back to the Russian Empire. The doctrinal interpretation of the independence of the agency 
is indeed “a defense against the strengthening Czarist rule in Finland at the end of the 19th 
century – the central administrative boards were for the most part led by Finnish men. […]”.
34. On the other hand, it is often argued101 that the independence of QUANGOs improve 
their performance. Starting from that assumption, it could be said that QUANGOs are created 
to enhance the achievements of the State, and are given more freedom of movement and 
means in order to do what the Executive is not able to do, for material or fi nancial reasons, 
for instance. Indeed, the modern State delivers services, and citizens have become consumers. 
In that case, QUANGOs might be set up in order to enable the State to carry out its task in 
a businesslike manner.102 However, the improvements carried out by the QUANGOs are 
not necessarily of an economic nature. Sometimes, it is assumed that QUANGOs are better 
equipped to fulfi l the requirements of equality, fairness or impartiality.
 The aim of effi ciency is often linked to “New public management”, defi ned as “a 
set of ideas and methods that aim to combine accountability and effi ciency in public 
administration.”103 However, the impact of this theory on the increase of QUANGOs is all 
but clear. Indeed, there is no obvious causal connection between the apparition of theories 
like “New Public Management” and the multiplication of QUANGOs. As an example, in 
Finland, the phenomenon of administrative agencies not belonging to a strongly hierarchical 
administrative structure under the Ministers or Ministries is certainly not new. International 
administrative trends such as “New Public Management” and “Good Governance” did not 
lead to the establishment of such administrative structures. Actually, one could assume that 
new means of governing introduced as a result of “New Public Management” have more 
likely decreased the independence of these agencies in their relation with Ministries, rather 
than increasing it. However, this development has not been the object of legal research.
 By contrast, the Japanese report confi rms the infl uence of “New Public Management” on 
the Administrative Reforms Council. This institution published some reports on the reforms 
of the national government organization between 1996 and 1999. It introduced the principle 
of separation between the policy-drafting and the policy-execution functions of government. 
101 Schinck, supra note 14, p. 43:
Les agences éparses trahissent généralement une solution d’expédient; souvent leur création a paru judicieuse 
dans des circonstances particulières, mais elle ne s’inscrit nullement dans un grand dessein. En revanche, il 
est probable que la séparation délibérée d’activités d’un ministère et leur attribution à une agence soit motivée 
par l’idée que les entités indépendamment centrées sur une mission sont plus effi caces que les services 
ministériels.
 
102 Denmark.
103 T. Hernes, Four ideal-type organizational responses to New Public Management reforms and some 
consequences, (71)1 International Review of administrative sciences 5-17 (2005).
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Its refl exions led to “The Basic Law of the Administrative Reform of the Central Government 
of 1998”, which provided that Commissions and Agencies – external bodies of the Ministry – 
shall assume implementing functions.
 The Belgian report does not explicitly take any position on the use of such theories, but 
gives a sceptical opinion regarding the “New Public Management” and similar schools, 
thereby wondering:
L’autorité administrative chargée d’assurer la régulation d’un secteur économique doit apparaître 
indépendante à l’égard du secteur soumis à régulation. Cette qualité lui permettra de garantir l’adoption de 
décisions conformes aux exigences d’impartialité, de non-discrimination et, plus généralement, aux principes 
de bonne administration. En se réjouissant de la promotion de telles valeurs, on en oublierait presque que, 
depuis longtemps, elles sont censées gouverner l’action des autorités administratives […]; c’est alors qu’à 
la distraction succède une question: comment les exigences auxquelles doit satisfaire l’action administrative 
justifi ent-elles aujourd’hui la création d’autorités indépendantes de l’administration centrale et des autorités 
politiques chargées du pouvoir exécutif? Ou bien la création d’autorités indépendantes est censée rencontrer 
les carences d’une action administrative n’affi chant pas les qualités évoquées ci-dessus, ce qui suppose que 
ces manquements aient été établis et révèlent un problème structurel, que la création d’autorités émancipées 
du contrôle d’autorités politiques permettrait de résoudre. Ou bien, rien ne permet de soutenir que, de manière 
générale, l’action administrative est exposée à des reproches tenant à son impartialité ou à l’égalité de 
traitement des opérateurs économiques, ce qui laisse alors entendre que la création d’autorités administratives 
indépendantes est animée d’autres considérations que la seule volonté d’assurer le respect de certains des 
principes généraux du droit administratif […].
35. Finally, QUANGOs fulfi ll a specifi c function in the global balance of power between 
the Executive and the Legislative branches with regard to their specifi c material missions. 
They might be a way of ensuring the control of a sector in the public interest. The State is 
there to provide a general service: It provides the framework and establishes general rules 
when this is necessary. And this necessity has sometimes been reintroduced into the defi nition 
of the authority of a specifi c sector. But to be able to do this, the State requires a thorough 
knowledge of the sector. And in some institutional frameworks, such missions do not belong 
to the Executive, but to specifi c independent agencies. We call that institutional framework 
the ‘Governance framework’, especially since it relies upon several key principles, such as 
openness, legitimacy, effectiveness, coherence and accountability.104 
 For present purposes, we borrow R. Laking’s defi nition of ‘governance’: 
At its most general level, governance […] means the constitutional, legal and administrative arrangements by 
which governments exercise their power as well as the related mechanisms for public accountability, rule of 
law, transparency, and citizen participation.
 Organisational governance is the rules and processes by which organisations are directed and controlled. 
[…] Organisational governance in the public sector refers to the control of public organisations so that they 
achieve the purposes for which they have been established and that their activities conform to the general 
principles of good governance.105
The United States provides the prototype for such logic. There, QUANGOs 
emerged at the end of the XIXth century as essential instruments of discipline of free enterprise, in the name 
of public interest […]. Sometimes, in this tempering of wild capitalism endeavor, they came into existence 
with the blessing of the regulatees themselves […]. They represent, in other words, the American model of 
104 Dutch report.
105 The Governance of the Wider State Sector: Principles for Control and Accountability of Delegated and 
Devolved Bodies, OECD Global Forum on Governance, Public Governance, 13 November 2001, p. 5. 
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public economic intervention. It is one that reluctantly engages into direct management […] and preferably 
exercises oversight. This model of indirect intervention was later used in other areas where it has now 
morphed into a model of protection of fundamental rights […] or elections regulation […]. Such a migration 
from the economic and social regulatory spheres to the constitutional and political regulatory realms is 
suffi ciently indicative of the adaptability of the American IRAs. It is also explicative of the large borrowing 
they gave rise to.106
36. Several national reports show how diffi cult it is to clearly identify the main trends (i.e. 
Neutrality, Effi ciency and Governance) behind the setting up of the QUANGOs in general as 
well as in specifi c cases. However, they also acknowledge the existence of these trends and 
logics and how confusing it might be to lift the veil and to look behind the legal and formal 
mechanisms. 
 Several reports sum up various reasons for the autonomisation of administrative entities. 
The principal reason outlined in the German report is the possibility of specialisation and 
expertise, protected from political decision-making. But this report adds other reasons such 
as the recognition of self-administration, as in the case of professionnal bodies; the protection 
of constitutional rights, as in the case of public broadcasting companies and universities; 
and the safeguarding of decision-making on social and cultural values. Two risks are pointed 
out “the danger of diverging or contradictory administrative decisions and an increasing 
ineffectiveness of supervisory mechanisms”, which gives rise to the question of whether the 
overall working of the State will be more effi cient.
 However, other reports tend to make a somewhat more positive link between effi ciency and 
legitimacy, whether these arise simultaneously107 or are more successive.108 
3.1.2. Modalities of QUANGOs’ Autonomy 
37. Autonomy can be examined from different angles, according to the different sources 
of the infl uence on QUANGOs and the scope of autonomy which QUANGOs enjoy with 
regard to the Executive and Legislative branches, on the one hand, and with regard to the 
regulated sector, on the other. The notion of independence or autonomy is not subject to 
a unique description. The notion can have at least three meanings. Those relationships 
will be discussed from different points of view, namely the independence of the staff, the 
independence of the QUANGO itself as a body (in the organization as well as with regard to 
its budget), and the independence of the QUANGOs concerning their actions.
106 QUANGOs are a part of the distribution of power and the weakening of the Executive power. Two other 
characteristics of the US government may have a similar favourable effect. First, the federal nature of the State 
determines the decentralization of the rule-making power among different levels of government. Second, the 
principle of checks and balances embedded in the Constitution supports a diffuse distribution of a given power 
(American report).
107 E.g., Dutch report.
108 E.g., Dutch report, Danish report.
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3.1.2.1. Autonomy of the staff
38. A fi rst issue is to know who will run the QUANGOs and what kind of qualities 
they need to have. How they are appointed, and so on. Who can propose a candidate? 
Parliament?109 The Executive? Other institutions (such as judges)? Or actors within a 
particular sector?
 In some systems, the Executive is the only one to appoint such bodies, following110 
discussions or hearings before Parliament.111 This implies that the autonomy of the staff 
of QUANGOs is offi cially recognized. In other systems, candidates come from different 
institutions and sectors and represent a range of interests, the sum of the various origins of the 
candidates meaning that the whole institution is deemed to be independent. 
 However, experts from a certain fi eld who are chosen for their knowledge of a specifi c 
sector and are appointed by the State are not necessarily representative of the sector. 
Such members can sometimes be found on the boards of QUANGOs or more often in 
ad hoc committees. In some countries, such as Finland, the boards of agencies may have 
representatives from the sector, but it is not at all typical that such collective organs have a 
strong position in the organisation of the agencies. Thus, the infl uence of the fi eld in question 
on, for example, the rule-making activities of the agencies, is not the result of the formal 
representation of the fi eld in the decision-making organs of the agencies. Moreover, as a rule 
the agency should ask for opinions from those affected or their representatives before issuing 
the legal rules in question. 
 Some guarantees are added to ensure independence. For instance, members cannot be 
dismissed before the end of their term of offi ce112 or only due to non-political reasons113 or 
under specifi c legal provisions;114 their mandate is not renewable,115 they are subject to some 
incompatibilities,116 and so on. 
109 E.g., Greece (at least for the QUANGOs listed in the Constitution).
110 Japan: A member of a Commission shall be appointed by the Prime Minister after special procedures 
(for example, the approval of both chambers of the Diet); Spain (the Minister shall appear before the relevant 
parliamentary committee to report on the proposed candidate).
111 E.g., the USA: consultations with senators prior to nomination, or through confi rmation after nomination.
112 E.g., France.
113 E.g., the USA; in Poland, the fi rst case of a member and the president of the National Council of Radio 
Broadcasting and Television itself being dismissed by the President – Lech Walesa – caused a stormy political 
discussion in the country as regards the prerogatives of the head of State.
114 E.g., Japan.
115 E.g., France.
116 E.g., France.
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3.1.2.2. Autonomy of the institution 
39. As a rule, QUANGOs are autonomous regarding their internal process, staff and so 
on. One delicate question is that of fi nancing117 and budgetary control. This is one of the rare 
occasions when Parliament has a real insight into a QUANGO. This control may be linked to 
the presentation of an annual report or a working program for the coming year. In the USA, 
for instance, the periodical authorization of a maximum level of expenditure as opposed 
to permanent authorization and annual appropriation has a signifi cant weight on agencies’ 
activities.118 These congressional rituals mobilize substantial agency resources, as they may 
result in a sanction or recompense for past action, and force agencies to carefully justify their 
request for funding. Congress may include prohibitions and instructions with respect to future 
action in the appropriations bills.
 Some national reports have underlined that QUANGOs can be dismissed by the Legislative 
branch (sometimes upon the initiative of the Government).119
3.1.2.3. Autonomy in the elaboration of acts issued by the institution
40. The independence of QUANGOs can be assessed according to the extent to which 
they are free to make their own rules, without any intervention by the Executive or the 
Legislature (when a general and full delegation of powers is provided). Situations vary 
greatly. Furthermore, questions regarding the independence of QUANGOs can also be 
assessed according to the position of their acts in the hierarchy of norms.
3.1.2.3.1. Roles of the Government or the Legislature
41. In some systems only QUANGOs oversee a regulation from its initiative 120 to its 
entry into force. For instance, in the USA, the agency enjoys discretion to use such a power 
and to draft the regulations that it deems appropriate. The only constraints are provided by the 
Constitution, the applicable statutes and case law. This entails that the agency does not co-
decide with any other entity. As a matter of principle, neither the President nor the Secretary 
117 This point is of huge importance and is very often much disputed (the power of QUANGOs to levy taxes 
gives them real independence as regards other institutions (as they do not have to rely on state resources to have 
their own policy) and is, for instance, not recognized in France due to a fear of the consequences thereof – See 
for an illustration Lombard, supra note 13, p. 531).
118 The Congressional Budget Offi ce plays a key role in this process.
119 E.g.: the USA.
120 Contra, in Belgium, in case some QUANGOs do not intervene when necessery, the Government may take 
the initiative.
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of State controls the initiative, or determines the content, or triggers the entry into force of the 
rules in question. Under the law, the American agency is the only body to enact the rules and 
it itself contributes to the corpus of administrative law.121 
 The situation is very similar in Finland, as the Ministries have, on the basis of their 
hierarchical position, no general powers to dictate how the agencies should act. The situation 
is also similar in Spain: The entry into force of the “Circulares” from the Bank of Spain, the 
National Securities Market Commission or the National Energy Commission does not require 
any approval by another administrative authority.
42. By contrast, in Belgium an approbation of the ‘règlement’ by the Executive is, as a 
rule, a mandatory requirement for the binding force of the regulation in question. However, 
this approbation may vary in accordance with the legal basis of such a power: sometimes the 
Executive may change the content of the rules or even may issue the rules itself instead of 
a failing QUANGO.122 In other cases, the only possibility is pure approbation without any 
conditions.123
 In the Netherlands, ministers also have the power to approve, postpone or annul certain 
administrative orders emanating from QUANGOs. 
 In Greece, the Minister may, by means of a reasoned decision, nullify the application 
of measures imposed by the Hellenic Competition Commission or modify them, if this is 
justifi ed on the basis of reasons of social policy or national economic public interest, which 
clearly exceed the purpose of all or some of the specifi c measures.
 In France, this interconnection between the Government and the agency, where one cannot 
decide without the other, is known as a “form of co-decision.”124
121 However, a legislative veto is possible (a resolution by which Congress nullifi es a regulation before it takes 
effect offers some degree of similarity with the power of approval vested in ministers elsewhere), see infra. 
122 Loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la surveillance du secteur fi nancier et aux services fi nanciers, art. 64, al. 3.
123 The Belgian report points out
cette approbation pure et simple ne doit cependant pas faire illusion et inspire d’évidentes questions: qu’en 
est-il de l’indépendance du C.S.A. qui, adoptant un règlement sur l’information politique en périodes 
électorales, doit le soumettre à l’approbation d’un Gouvernement dont les membres fi gurent parmi les 
destinataires de la norme?
 
124 
le pouvoir réglementaire accordé par la loi aux autorités administratives indépendantes par la loi est en réalité 
partagé avec l’autorité ministérielle chargée d’homologuer les règlements adoptés. Ainsi par exemple, l’art. 
L. 36-6 du Code des postes et des communications électroniques précise-t-il que “les décisions prises en vertu 
du présent article sont , après homologation par arrêté du ministre chargé des communications électroniques, 
publiées au Journal offi ciel.” Dans un tel cas, le pouvoir réglementaire est exercé de manière conjointe par 
l’autorité indépendante et par l’autorité ministérielle dans le cadre d’une véritable procédure de codécision 
puisque aucune des autorités ne peut décider sans l’aval de l’autre. Il en va de même par exemple on l’a vu 
pour le règlement général adopté par l’autorité des marchés fi nanciers aux termes de l’art. L. 621-6 du Code 
monétaire et fi nancier. De même, dans le projet de loi relatif à la transparence et à la sécurité en matière 
nucléaire, il est prévu que les “décisions réglementaires à caractère technique (adoptées par l’Autorité de 
sûreté nucléaire) pour compléter les modalités d’application des décrets et arrêtés pris en matière de sûreté 
nucléaire ou de radioprotection […] sont soumises à l’homologation des ministres chargés de la sûreté 
nucléaire […] et de la radioprotection.” (art. 2 bis).
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3.1.2.3.2. Hierarchy of norms
43. The position of the rule in the hierarchy of norms can be discussed from several 
angles: with regard to laws and regulations, or with regard to acts adopted by other 
QUANGOS. In the fi rst case, the position of acts adopted by QUANGOs is the lowest in the 
hierarchy of norms.125 The second aspect is more complicated.126
 In this context, the specifi c position in the USA can be underlined.
Three series of observations can be made. First, regarding their relationship with statutes enacted by 
Congress, rules issued by IRAs present a lesser legal value than the congressional rules. They must in fact 
conform not only to the relevant statutes but also to the Constitution and the case law. 
 Second, as to reciprocal relationship among the regulations produced by IRAs, because IRAs are not 
structured as a hierarchical branch of government, there is no hierarchy between the regulations produced by 
them. All the products of IRAs’ legislative rulemaking share the same legal status. Compatibility among those 
rules results from voluntarily coordination among agencies.
 Third, the place of the binding norms formulated by IRAs relative to the executive orders promulgated 
by the President is controversial. At fi rst sight, it can be easily stated: due to their independence, IRAs are 
not subject to presidential pronouncements. Nevertheless, the claim for a unitary Presidency that would 
incorporate executive as well as independent agencies, a certain realism in view of the implications of the 
President’s responsibilities in wartime, challenge in whole or in part this apparently easy determination.
3.1.3. Scope of QUANGO Powers: Theory and Practice
44. QUANGOs exercise formal powers – which can be called their core – as laid down 
in their constitutive acts. Those powers can take various forms and have different legal 
consequences as they may be of a legislative, executive or judicial nature,127 either individual 
or general. For instance, QUANGOs might have purely advisory competence – towards the 
Executive or the Legislative branch128 – or this competence may extend as far as decision- 
making powers in a wide range of ways: licensing, authorizing, inspecting, controlling, 
sanctioning, issuing guidelines, interpreting general laws, issuing regulations, or allocating 
and granting economic means.129
 One can note that QUANGOs enjoy a very broad range of powers, with one exception. As 
a rule, the use of “force publique” extends to the actual exercise of “executive” power. Hence 
QUANGOs do not usually have the means to imprison people.130 
125 E.g., Finland.
126 See, Rapport du Conseil d’Etat, supra note 47 , pp. 341-344. 
127 The allocation of the three types of powers to one entity is possible in France, as long as the QUANGO in 
question is not the body which is entitled to control the legality of its own acts. 
128 QUANGOs also issue advice and recommendations to the State (Switzerland) at their own behest or when 
required to do so by the public authorities. Sometimes, this practice goes as far as participating in the elaboration 
of laws or règlements, by means of advice or recommendations, which may or may not be compulsory (Spain). 
The practical force of those instruments has been recognized by the courts (France). In a more indirect way, 
representing the State in international negotiations is a way of participating in the elaboration of règlements. 
For instance, the French ‘Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité’ may represent the 
French State in international and European organisations.
129 E.g., Denmark.
130 Rapport du Conseil d’Etat français, supra note 47, p. 296.
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 The French Conseil d’Etat states that the common-law countries are more likely to extend 
the three kinds of powers to QUANGOs while the French system does not give the three 
powers to every entity.131 
 The wide and mixed range of QUANGO powers are explained as follows in the French 
report:
Le recours à une autorité administrative indépendante est parfois justifi é par le fait que ces autorités peuvent 
être chargées de l’ensemble des activités de régulation d’un secteur: détermination des règles applicables 
et prise en charge de leur application, par la délivrance d’autorisations, le règlement de différents (sic) ou 
encore le prononcé de sanctions administratives. C’est là encore le critère de la spécialisation technique et 
de l’effi cacité qu’elle implique qui est mis en avant. Un tel regroupement de compétences juridiques serait 
la garantie de la bonne information du titulaire du pouvoir de réglementation sur les problèmes pratiques 
rencontrés dans la mise en œuvre des règles existantes et assurerait donc leur adaptation rapide et pertinente. 
A l’inverse, le fait que l’autorité en charge de l’application des règles en ait déterminé le contenu serait la 
garantie de leur interprétation correcte au regard des objectifs poursuivis. (our emphasis.)
45. If we stick to rule-making power, different kinds of systems can be distinguished: In 
some countries, the rule-making is very limited to a narrow range of competences, preferably 
relating to technical matters132 and without being automatic,133 while in other countries, such 
as the USA, the rule-making power encompasses a broad discretion which is to be exercised 
under the guidance of principles laid down by Congress. The American QUANGOs thus 
enjoy primary rule-making power. In this context, reference to a real autonomous rule-making 
power seems to be particularly justifi ed. 
46. QUANGOs also often exercise non-legally binding powers,134 which can take several 
forms and entail a number of problems. Those instruments might be mainly directed towards 
members of the public (and no longer only public entities) as the following American and 
French examples illustrate.
47. A fi rst and fairly elaborate system exists in the USA where the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act of 1990 set up what is called “Regulatory negotiation”, or a process through which the 
agency, the regulated industry and other stakeholders seek consensus on a proposed rule. 
Rejecting a command-and-control approach to regulation, it purports to shorten the rule-
making process, to increase compliance, to reduce litigation, and to produce better rules. It is 
not a new requirement, but an option that agencies may ignore.
 This method does have several drawbacks. First, as the negotiation is not binding it 
adds an extra step in the “notice and comment” procedure.(see infra n°57). Secondly, it 
simultaneously deprives the agency of the superiority attached to its nature as a public entity, 
131 Rapport du Conseil d’Etat français, supra note, p. 280.
132 E.g.,France, Belgium, Switzerland, Geramany.
133 E.g., France.
134 In Spain, due to the criticism or the evolution towards real rule-making power, those practices have 
disappeared.
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thereby reducing the public interest to the level of private interests. Thus, it creates confusion 
concerning the status of the respective participants and the represented interests at stake that 
offers a breeding ground for regulatory control. 
 Besides this, there are interpretive rules and policy statements which aim to provide 
guidelines concerning which voluntary compliance is expected from the regulated sector. The 
agencies can employ non-codifi ed informal techniques of their own such as letters, speeches, 
news media interviews, threats of enforcement, and presentations at professional meetings to 
communicate the proper conduct to be exhibited by the regulated parties.135
48. In France, there is a specifi c tool called “Le pouvoir réglementaire dérivé”. Through 
the exercise of numerous powers at an individual level (sanctions, authorisation or dispute 
resolution), QUANGOs can exercise a form of rule-making. This power is developed through 
the interpretation of norms (legal or regulatory) that QUANGOs have to apply in their 
discretionary power. As the fi eld is highly technical, interpretation is necessary to provide 
precision, to include the various situations within a specifi c framework, and to take technical 
and market developments into account. 
 This has resulted in the development of a real doctrine aiming at some coherence in the use 
of the QUANGOs’ discretionary power. Even if this is not really original, its main importance 
is as “la légitimité démocratique défaillante des autorités administratives indépendantes 
confère une place relativement plus importante à la légitimité qu’elles peuvent tirer de leur 
effi cacité.” It implies that QUANGOs are required to be effi cient and they need to use any 
possible tool to achieve their goals. One way to fulfi ll this mission is the forseeability of 
QUANGOs’ decisions as ensured by this “doctrine”.
 On a practical side, the importance of this doctrine can really forge a whole section of 
the law. However, this may not hinder the use of regulatory power. New rules can never 
jeopardize an individual examination of each situation by a QUANGO. However, the 
boundary between the “ interpretation of a rule” and the “creation of a new rule” can be thin 
and has to be assessed by the court in each case. 
49. In short, even when QUANGOs have a limited formal rule-making power, they can 
use a wide scope of other non-legal tools that are likely to shape the behaviour of citizens or 
the regulated sector. This situation calls for some criticism, as is illustrated by the following 
excerpt: 
En outre, et plus encore si l’Autorité administrative en cause a du prestige et de l’autorité […]; il suffi t que, 
notamment par le biais de son Président, elle formule des observations générales, des anticipations, ou des 
souhaits, pour que le crédit dont elle dispose entraîne le respect de ces formulations générales par les parties 
prenantes, surtout si nous sommes dans un système auto-observé, comme si elles étaient dotées d’une portée 
normative. On peut alors faire l’observation suivante. Si au nom de la réticence de principe, légitime et portée 
135 E.g., the USA, France.
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par le Conseil Constitutionnel lui-même, on refuse à des Autorités le pouvoir réglementaire, une autorité 
pourra puiser dans son propre crédit pour l’exercer en fait, sur le mode d’une Soft Law dont on connaît la 
puissance, et sans que les parties prenantes disposent des protections juridiques que leur offre l’exercice d’un 
pouvoir juridique formel […] Sans doute vaut-il mieux que le droit confère, c’est-à-dire organise et limite, 
des pouvoirs plutôt que de feindre d’ignorer ceux qui sont exercés de fait.136
3.1.4. Accountability of QUANGOs
50. Since a degree of independence is in principle given to QUANGOs, some “limits” 
should be set. That overview can be seen as a continuum from control ex ante to control 
ex post in the form of accountability (political) or judicial review (legal). The fi rst will 
be examined here as part of the relationship between QUANGOs, the Executive and the 
Legislature. The latter will be studied in the last section.
 Accountability “is the duty to give account for one’s actions to some other person or 
body”137 or “a liability to reveal, to explain, and to justify what one does; how one discharges 
responsabilities, fi nancial or other, whose several origins may be political, constitutional, 
hierarchical or contractual.”138
 The question of accountability implies certain sub-questions: how will who hold whom for 
what?139
 As regards our topic, this question can be asked as follows:
What kind of control mechanisms exist?1) 
Which of the QUANGOs’ acts are subject to forms of accountability? Results, policies, 2) 
regulations? 
Who is accountable before Parliament? The QUANGO itself or the Executive on behalf of the 3) 
QUANGO?
Is the QUANGO accountable before Parliament? The Executive? The sector? The citizens? 4) 
51. Those questions could be asked in relation to any kind of intervention or policies 
developed by QUANGOs. However, the limited scope of this study will focus on the 
mechanisms surrounding the rule-making power. It is assumed that such a power should be 
more formally controlled, as 
[…] le pouvoir réglementaire occupe parmi les pouvoirs classiques de l’administration une place particulière 
qui réclame une justifi cation poussée puisque les effets de l’adoption d’une norme générale et impersonnelle 
sont en principe plus importants que ceux qui découlent de l’adoption d’une simple décision individuelle.140
136 Gélard, supra note 3, p. 120.
137 C. Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38 (2000), spec. p. 40.
138 E. L. Normaton, Public accountability and audit: A reconnaissance, in Smith & Hague, The Dilemma of 
accountability in Modern Government: Independence versus Control 311 (1971), cited by Scott, supra note 137, 
p. 40.
139 See R. Behn, The New Public Management Paradigm and the search for Democratic Accountability, 1(2) 
International Public Management Journal 131-164 (1998).
140 French report.
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Indeed, since QUANGOs have some decision-making powers, they have to explain what they 
have done and what they plan to do at a general (e.g. an annual report or the working program 
for the coming year) or one-off (a specifi c decision) level. This explanation can take a number 
of forms and may occur directly before Parliament or indirectly through the Government, 
which is itself responsible to Parliament. This is an obligation to provide the necessary 
grounds for all decisions taken, a means to limit this power in a democratic State. 
 However, in a ‘regulatory State’ the limitation of power and the justifi cation of power in 
the pursuit of the general interest can be achieved in other ways than through Parliament. 
This is what is called an ‘extended accountability’, which implies that powers can be given 
through some procedures beyond the representatives of the people. Links with “participatory 
democracy” can easily be made given that, in such a system, key principles such as 
transparency, participation, evaluation or the duty to provide reasoned decisions have to be 
respected.141
 Three ways of accounting for decisions will be addressed: before Parliament, through 
the Government and in extended ways. One kind does not exclude the other. One could say 
that these forms of control are layered. However, several ways to oversee QUANGOs were 
already touched upon while explaining the autonomy of QUANGOs. 
3.1.4.1. Accountability towards Parliament
52. In some countries (such as France, the USA or in Spain), QUANGOs are directly 
accountable to Parliament. The modalities of such direct control vary. Indeed, in the 
USA, Congress has a wide range of ways to keep abreast with the strategy developed by a 
QUANGO, to control it, to steer it, while the means are more limited in France.142 
 In Spain QUANGOs are controlled by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and 
appearance before the Chambers on request is compulsory. Nevertheless, specifi c procedures 
apply, including restricted access to certain information, but Parliament has the fi nal decision 
on the subject (for details of the confi dentiality obligation – see the national report).
 The annual report of the Central Bank and, when relevant, any other reports submitted 
to Parliament are sent to the government or to the Economy and Finance Minister. 
Also, Parliament and the Government are regularly informed of the objectives and the 
implementation of monetary policy. A more or less similar regulation applies to other 
QUANGOs like the National Securities Market Commission, the National Energy 
Commission and the National Telecommunications Commission. 
 In the USA, the accountability of QUANGOs is very elaborate, 
141 See for more details, Lombard, supra note 13.
142  Rapport du Conseil d’Etat français, supra note 47, p. 369: in most cases, Parliament has the right to hold 
hearings of the QUANGOs, but does not often use this authority.
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with a particular sense of entitlement arising from the view that these agencies constitute its (sic) arms in 
confrontations with the President.  The way for some accountability are the hearing before appointing the 
members, the approval of the budget, the use of the legislative veto143 or even the dismissal of the QUANGO. 
One very specifi c measure is the Congressional Review Act of 1996 which provides that, before their rules 
can take effect [….], agencies must submit them to each House along with a cost-benefi t analysis. In creating 
this quasi-systematic […] legislative fi lter, the Act adds another procedural step to that articulated by the 
APA and contributes to a cumbersome decision making. Apart from cost-benefi t concerns, Congress may also 
pass or attempt to pass a statute designed to substitute its own judgment for that of an agency on a specifi c 
regulatory policy question […].
 Lastly, investigations conducted by congressional committees constitute another powerful device of 
formal political supervision. The public legislative hearings in which administrative action is carefully 
scrutinized and a commissioner or staff member is plied with questions symbolizes the unparalleled 
sophistication of American congressional control over administrative action, in general and by IRAs, in 
particular. Individual oversight by representatives or senators also takes place. Through correspondence or 
meetings, the latter convey the concerns of their constituents.
3.1.4.2. Accountability through the Executive 
53. In some systems, some forms of accountability are more or less formally given to the 
Executive through reports. Sometimes, it implies that Parliament and the Executive receive 
the same information simultaneously. In Spain, for instance, Parliament and the Government 
are regularly informed of the objectives and the implementation of monetary policy by the 
Central Bank.
 In other systems, the Executive controls QUANGOs. In Denmark, for instance, ministers 
have an obligation to carry out a certain overall supervision of the QUANGOs. If a minister 
becomes aware of unlawful activities or inexpediencies, he or she may approach the 
management of the QUANGO in question or he or she may take the matter to the State 
Auditor’s Offi ce or the police. The minister may also propose that new legislation be enacted 
by Parliament in order to control a QUANGO that does not act in a satisfactory manner.
54. The system of the accountability of the Executive to Parliament is required by several 
national constitutions, which implies full ministerial responsability to Parliament. This is 
consistent with the democratic principle144 and the principe de séparation des pouvoirs.145 The 
result of this might be very diffi cult and not entirely consistent with the same principles, at 
least at fi rst sight. 
143 Since 1983: in order, constitutionally, to resort to a legislative veto, Congress must ensure the involvement 
of both Houses and of the President.
144 Germany; in Japan, the question arose but the solution was the reorganisation of QUANGOs; in Finland, 
too, the question arose with the reorganisation of QUANGOs in the 1980s.
At least one of the arguments put forward when the old national administrative agencies were done away 
with was that their elimination would strengthen the parliamentary system of government. The aim was 
that Ministers responsible for the Parliament should have a stronger say in the activities of the entire state 
administration in their respective fi elds. When new national administrative agencies with “hard” powers 
– such as the power of rule-making – have then later on been (re)founded, the question of a parliamentary 
system of government has not been central.
 
145 Belgium.
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 For constitutional reasons, countries like Belgium146 require that “l’exercice du pouvoir 
exécutif ne peut être confi é à des institutions échappant au contrôle des autorités politiques 
et, plus particulièrement, des assemblées législatives.”147 As a result, QUANGOs cannot have 
any rule-making power except in a very technical context and only as far as binding force is 
given to the general rules by an organ which is as politically responsible as the Government 
(via approbation, for instance).
 In the Netherlands, ministers sometimes have the right to approve or disapprove of 
QUANGO regulations. However, they cannot alter these rules. So the power to disapprove 
is inadequate as a steering mechanism. Together with the fact that QUANGOs are not 
subordinate to the authority of Ministers, the only thing that is left to a Minister, who wants 
to infl uence the course of a QUANGO’s policy, is to use his or her right to give general 
directions to the board of directors. No one knows exactly how ‘general’ these directions have 
to be in order to prevent Ministers from putting unauthorized pressure on QUANGOs. This 
is a very diffi cult balance, as policy rules or general instructions for QUANGOs could easily 
confl ict with the independent position and expert role of certain QUANGOs. After some 
hesitation surrounding this issue in the preparation of the new draft of general principles, 
ministers also have the authority to make policy rules that are binding for competition 
authorities. According to legal scholars, this is not necessarily problematic from the 
perspective of the separation of powers, as long as competition authorities have the authority 
to deviate from these policy rules in unexpected circumstances and Ministers refrain from 
interference in individual cases.
55. In the USA, the extent of Presidential control is uncertain from a legal standpoint. 
Some methods of Presidential overview are well defi ned, such as the power of nomination,148 
the litigating authority,149 or clearance from the President for their budget and legislative 
proposals before submitting them to Congress. As a result, although some exceptions were 
introduced in the 1970s, the Offi ce of Management and Budget is allowed to sift through 
the IRAs’ proposals and endorse, correct or reject them, taking into account the current 
presidential directives. 
Notwithstanding these legal powers, the controversial question of the applicability of executive orders 
to independent agencies blurs the limits of IRAs’ independence. Although the principle of independence 
146 Similar reasoning in the German report.
147 The reasoning leading to this conclusion is very clearly exposed in the Belgian report:
1° il se déduit de l’article 33 de la Constitution que les pouvoirs régis par celle-ci ne peuvent être exercés que 
par les organes désignés à cette fi n par le Constituant […];
2° s’agissant du pouvoir exécutif, c’est au Roi (ou, éventuellement, aux ministres du Gouvernement fédéral) 
qu’il appartient de l’exercer au niveau fédéral, tandis que – pour les entités fédérées – l’exercice de ce pouvoir 
est attribué aux Gouvernements de Communautés ou de Région.
 
148 In particular, the President appoints the chairperson of the independent agencies.
149 The authority to petition the Supreme Court lies with the Solicitor General within the Department of Justice.
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seems to naturally shield the IRAs from the supervisory control of the President in the issuance of rules,150 
the claim has been repeatedly made that the President could legally subject them to his methodological 
instructions in this regard. Extensive historical studies conclude that the constant rejection by successive 
presidents of the attempts to full independence prevented the formation of a customary rule upholding the 
claimed independence […]. Other scholars […] as well as the DOJ and the ABA […] have contended that 
the limitation of the presidential removal power did not entail an immunity from presidential oversight 
of the substance of the IRAs’ rulemaking as long as it remained short of a blunt substitution of decision. 
Such a conception would deprive the President of a power to remove IRAs’ commissioners and to override 
their decisions but would entitle him to supervise rulemaking proceedings by IRAs. As it suggests more a 
difference of degree than that of nature between executive and independent agencies, the successive and 
recent reiterations of its formulation leave the IRAs in an unstable position in the American administrative 
government, despite the judicial validation of the delegation of power and the limited removal power.
3.1.4.3. Extended accountability
56. From a classical accountability towards Parliament by ministers, accountability in a 
so-called “regulatory State” has also evolved to what is called “extended accountability”, that 
is, accountability towards political bodies, horizontal bodies (to a parallel institution such as 
an auditing commission), and benefi ciaries (consumers, markets, users).151 
57. The prototype of the system where extended accountability has been developed 
through the procedure of transparency, participation and reasoned decisions is the American 
one. As it is apparent that other systems try to use some of the tools developed there, it seems 
interesting to provide a deeper insight into the procedure of elaborating (general) rules. 
Basically, rules can be adopted in two ways, one informal, one formal, depending on the type 
of matters to be regulated.
 In short, the informal procedure (applicable by default) is a procedure of “notice and 
comment” rule-making with one main aim, namely to achieve transparency from 1946 
onwards. The proceedings go through three phases: notice, comment and publication. The 
fi rst phase152 has an informational purpose: the agency informs the public that it intends to 
promulgate a rule. To this end, it publishes a ‘notice of rule-making’ in which it indicates 
the legal basis of the proceedings and presents the proposed rule or the issues involved. 
The second step153 in the informal rule-making process is a comment phase during which 
the public submit ‘written comments’ on the agency’s contemplated rule. It symbolizes the 
participatory characteristic of American informal rule-making which calls to mind a kind of 
Congressional debate without any verbal sparring. The effective participants are the regulated 
industries and other interest groups (as well as other QUANGOs). The third phase is a 
150 B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 19 (3d ed. 1991). 
In support of this thesis 2 examples may be referred to. President Reagan’s requested voluntary implementation of Exec. Order 
No. 12, 291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (requiring federal agencies to conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis) on the part of IRCs. 
All declined to comply. President Clinton’s Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) requiring federal agencies to 
conduct cost-benefi t analysis exempted independent agencies from conducting this analysis. 
151 Scott, supra note 137, pp. 38-60.
152 The aim is transparency.
153 The aim is participation.
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decisional and explanatory phase whereby the IRA issues the fi nal rule along with “a concise 
general statement of its basis and purpose”. However, due to the transfi guration of informal 
rule-making by the review, this last phase has become a time-consuming and meticulous 
exercise of rational justifi cation for the given decision, as the QUANGO has to discuss 
alternate options that might have been submitted by interested parties.
 Even though the APA sketches out the three steps involved in informal rule-making, its 
language, if taken literally, affords the agency a certain degree of procedural fl exibility in the 
exact design of each phase. Thus, it appears to be informal. In contrast, formal rule-making 
is strictly defi ned. It is called formal because it borrows several features from the formal 
adjudicatory process. Instead of the comment and the concise general statement, a hearing 
on which administrative law judges or commissioners will preside is held by the agency. In 
addition to documentary evidence, the parties resort to testimony and cross-examination to 
further their arguments. 
 This pattern has been supplemented on two occasions. Firstly, in 1966, supplementary 
legislation either promoted transparency or a cost-benefi t analysis of administrative action. 
As regards the fi rst objective, IRAs are required to make their records available to satisfy 
the right of information enjoyed by the public and to follow specifi c procedures when 
soliciting advice. In pursuance of the second goal, they are mandated to develop information 
on the paperwork burden generated by their rules, to reduce the regulatory burden on 
small businesses and to assess the environmental impact of certain regulations. Secondly, 
the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 demands that multiheaded agencies hold 
open meetings. Thus, this statute adds an additional layer of openness and opportunity for 
public participation in the rule-making undertaken by IRAs. Nevertheless, the subsequent 
avoidance behaviour adopted by commissioners doing their utmost to reduce the number 
of meetings covered by the Act is a suffi cient indication of the inhibitions caused by its 
enactment. Moreover, despite their contribution to the democratization and rationalization 
of administrative action, these statutes have had a cumulative side-effect. The independence 
attribute is powerless to spare the IRAs from such a rigidity. 
58. However, the diffi culties arising from control by the regulated industry in the USA 
might be underlined. Indeed, the American report stresses 
Not only are independent agencies subject to political control but they are also subject to the infl uence of 
the economic forces targeted by their regulation. According to the regulatory capture thesis, independent 
agencies are said to come under the infl uence of the regulated industries. This phenomenon is analyzed either 
as an inherent feature of regulation […] or an inevitable phase of the typical development […]. It refl ects a 
broader reality of any administrative government, that of identifi cation of a given unit – whether executive 
or independent – with the interests of the particular industry that it regulates. In the US as elsewhere, 
professional organizations, interest groups serve as the formal and informal (ex parte contact) media of 
such control. But one characteristic of the US administrative law is that it makes American Independent or 
executive agencies especially vulnerable to regulatory capture. To the extent that the regulated companies 
possess the means to avail themselves of the participatory guarantee of informal rulemaking, administrative 
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procedure itself may be viewed as fostering a disproportionate power of the industry over the agencies. The 
transparency legislation was precisely designed to curb this trend. The rise of citizen groups, the complexity 
of each of the regulated industries, result in competing strategies of instrumentalization of the agencies which 
makes the capture phenomenon a dynamic process.
At a theoretical level, legal scholars underline that the search for more transparency might 
lead to the opposite result. Indeed, the accumulation of control, and the opacity in the different 
layers of control, can lead to the following question: if every entity/everyone controls every 
other entity, who is actually controlling whom and who in practice asks questions to whom 
and on what basis?
59. Those questions have not dissuaded several countries from borrowing some elements 
of extended accountability and from attempting to establish them in their respective systems, 
with more or less awareness of the implementation problems. The following examples, 
commented upon when necessary, are noteworthy. 
 In the Netherlands, general principles are drafted which try to adapt ‘good governance 
principles’ so that they apply to QUANGOs.154
 In Japan, some forms of extended accountability can be found. Indeed, the Japanese report 
points to recent modifi cations to the Administrative Procedure Law of 2005. It now requires 
the competent authority to give notice of a proposed regulation and its resources to the public, 
allowing them to submit comments on the draft, and, after taking the comments suffi ciently 
into consideration, to make a statement containing the presented comments or their summary 
and the consequences of consideration and their reasons at that time the authorities issue a 
fi nal regulation. The amendments entered into force on 1 April 2006.
 The attempt to promote more transparency and to gain more legitimacy through 
participation has been transposed elsewhere, including in Belgium. However, here, the issue is 
to assess whether those new modalities surrounding the elaboration of the ‘règlement’ is real 
or a mascarade. For instance, QUANGOs can opt for submitting their projects to consultation, 
but they can also discontinue this practice whenever they want.155 This having been said, 
some acts are elaborated directly with those regulated or with their representatives in the 
QUANGO,156 an issue which raises some questions about the independence of the QUANGO. 
 Access to the documents or the obligation to provide reasoned decisions is also limited 
in Belgium. Firstly, QUANGOs have to be qualifi ed as ‘autorités administratives’ according 
to Belgian law and this is not always the case. Secondly, no general rule of providing 
154 The main question in the Dutch report illustrates this concern “To what extent do QUANGOs possess 
(autonomous) regulatory powers, and are there any principles of good governance that can and will be used to 
master these powers?” (emphasis in the text).
155 Commission bancaire, fi nancière et des assurances.
156 Collège d’avis institué au sein du Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel.
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reasoned decisions applies to the ‘règlement’, as the rule only applies to individual acts. 
Lastly, documents are accessible provided that the legal requirements are met (conditions and 
exceptions). 
 Another kind of extended accountability may be found in a Danish example, where, for a 
number of QUANGOs, the auditing of their accounts is carried out by a private accountant, in 
parallel with the control by the State’s Auditors Offi ce.157
3.2. Control by the Judiciary on a Case-by-Case Basis 
60. In principle, judicial review exists in one way or another, according to the general rules 
of each national system. In other words, control might be very different from system to 
system, but is generally consistent with the judicial control used with regard to the Executive. 
It implies that the responsibility of the State/QUANGO can be questioned, that a particular act 
can be set aside, made void, repealed, and so on. For instance, in the Netherlands, 
[t]he liability for unlawful governmental acts normally has to be established by an administrative court. The 
jurisdiction of these courts relies on the General Administrative Law Act. According to this act, courts are 
allowed to judge the legality of administrative orders. Administrative courts will not only check if written 
laws are obeyed but also if principles of proper administration have been followed, such as the principles of 
due care, proportionality, good faith, legal certainty, and equality. 
 When a decision confl icts with one of these principles, courts will approve the appeal and annul the 
order. The administrative authority then has to take a new decision with respect to the court’s decision. In 
some cases the judicial decision can even replace the annulled administrative order, but this does not often 
happen. Dutch administrative courts can also order a QUANGO to pay compensation for the damage that is 
suffered by the public. In case a QUANGO has corporative personality according to private law it cannot shift 
the paying of damages to the state treasury. However, not all administrative orders can be brought before an 
administrative court. Article 8:2 GALA states that “no appeal may be lodged against: (a) an order containing 
a generally binding regulation or a policy rule, (b) an order repealing or laying down the entry into force of 
a generally binding regulation or policy rule, (c) an order approving an order, containing a generally binding 
regulation or a policy rule or repealing or laying down the entry into force of a generally binding regulation or 
a policy rule.” Because of this it is important to determine the legal nature of the order that may have caused 
liability.
In Spain, a procedure also exists whereby an Act grants the right to challenge the rules of 
QUANGOs before the Courts (administrative courts or specifi c instances) within two months 
of their publication in the Offi cial Journal.
 In France, the independence of QUANGOs implies that the only control upon them is 
judicial control a posteriori, limited to the legality of the decision (as opposed to controlling the 
merits (‘opportunité’)). As a rule, administrative courts are competent, but in order to unify 
the rules of competence in some cases, the judicial courts are also competent concerning 
some QUANGOs.158 Lastly, QUANGOs could lead to a fi nding which determines the State’s 
liability.
 Some interesting derogations from this picture are provided by the Belgian situation. In 
some cases, the specifi c location of QUANGOs among the Executive and the Legislative 
157 The Danish National Research Foundation can be mentioned as an example.
158 For instance, for decisions from the ‘conseil de la concurrence’.
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branches brings them within the sphere of the Legislative branch. In those cases, QUANGOs 
are not qualifi ed under Belgian law as ‘autorités administratives’, and their acts are not subject 
to the control of the Conseil d’Etat.159 Secondly, in some cases, the competent court is not 
the Conseil d’Etat but the judicial court (especially the Brussels court of appeal) as is the 
case in France. However, in Belgium, the powers recognized for the court of appeal do not 
encompass all the activities of QUANGOs. This puts the relevance of the claimed aims of 
the unity of case law, simplicity, speed, reinforcement of legal security, etc. into perspective. 
As Belgium has a limited judicial review of legislative acts, it means that QUANGOs may 
promulgate acts without any judicial control being possible.
 Secondly, concerns regarding the use of a specialized court requires some refl exion on its 
powers. How does this court acquire this expertise? What kind of expertise is required? The 
normal expert authority regarding administrative acts is the Conseil d’Etat. However, if the 
expertise lies in the specifi c and technical fi eld, ways of obtaining this experience are needed. 
However, in some cases, the court not only has a limited power to control legality, but also 
enjoys full jurisdiction, which implies that it must reassess the case on the merits, and can thus 
substitute its decision for that of the QUANGO. This generates many questions regarding the 
actual independence of the QUANGOs from the political control that should surround such 
politically tainted decisions, decisions which are normally taken by a politicallly responsible 
authority. 
4. Conclusion – The QUANGO: a System Somewhere in between Facts and Norms 
61.  QUANGOs are created and used as an alternative to the traditional organization of the 
State, which is supposed to fulfi ll a role of social and economic regulation. Many countries 
have been caught in a legitimacy crisis for quite some time. One solution was/is to use 
independent experts to help fulfi ll the State’s regulatory functions (used in its ordinary sense). 
Those experts are now found in QUANGOs. This raises a number of questions, which we will 
attempt to address, albeit in a summary fashion. 
159 
La situation des ‘comités sectoriels’ institués au sein de la Commission de protection de la vie privée en 
offre une illustration intéressante. […] [A la suite d’une récente transformation] en organe collatéral du 
pouvoir législatif fédéral, la Commission de protection de la vie privée ne pourrait donc se voir reconnaître 
la qualité d’ ‘autorité administrative’ […], faisant partager ce sort aux comités sectoriels institués en son sein. 
Cet assujettissement à un organe du pouvoir législatif exclut donc que les actes de ces comités sectoriels 
puissent faire l’objet d’un recours en annulation devant le Conseil d’Etat, à tout le moins en l’état actuel de la 
législation […].
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62. The position of QUANGOs in the fi fteen countries studied here differs. In some 
countries, QUANGOs do not give rise to any debate,160 while their constitutionality is 
questioned in others.161 Interestingly, in spite of doubts surrounding their legality, they do not 
enjoy some rule-making power in the latter countries.
 However, we have noted a number of mechanisms – germane to each country – through 
which the autonomy of the entity is circumscribed. Among those factors restraining 
QUANGOs, their rule-making power is very limited, with some exceptions. In the United 
States, a broad discretion is given to the QUANGOs: Where the legal basis remains unclear, 
the attribution of rule-making power is presumed. This is not the case in a number of 
countries, however, as a number of national reports attest. As one concluded: 
All in all, the regulatory powers of QUANGOs remain controversial.162
or
Or il apparaît qu’en réalité, le pouvoir règlementaire des autorités administratives indépendantes n’est que 
très secondaire par rapport aux autres pouvoirs qui leur sont octroyés, qu’il s’agisse du pouvoir d’accorder 
des autorisations, de régler des différends ou encore de prononcer des sanctions.163
63. In view of this statement, the following pages will attempt to briefl y summarize the 
main underlying questions concerning the rule-making power of QUANGOs. 
64. First, the position of QUANGOs with regard to both the Legislative and the Executive 
branches is not always solid. In the USA, for instance, 
In fact, as in Europe, the constitutionality of the design of independent agencies has been a matter of 
controversy. The reasons for the controversy were similar. The organizational separation and the correlative 
degree of independence, on the one hand, seem not to square with the constitutional vision of the presidential 
leadership of administration […], the delegation of legislative, executive and adjudicatory powers […], on 
the other hand, seems to fl out the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. […] The Supreme 
Court also validated the limitation of the President’s power to remove their commissioners […], although 
independence from the President seems to establish independent agencies as competitors with the chief of 
Executive branch.
65. Secondly, research on rule-making power tends to confi rm the diffi culties found in 
answering the following question “how will who hold whom accountable for what?” 
 In this report, the “what” corresponds to the existence and the use of the rule-making 
power by the QUANGOs. Rule-making can be described as a way of infl uencing and 
modeling facts and reality towards a defi ned goal by means of general, abstract, impersonal 
160 E.g., Spain.
161 E.g., Belgium; even in the USA, “Nevertheless, the existence of the IRAs still stirs up a legal controversy 
despite these judicial pronouncements.”
162 Dutch report.
163 French report.
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and binding or non-binding rules. In what follows, we will focus on the issues in countries 
other than the USA. Consequently, rule-making will be used in a narrow sense, thus excluding 
non-binding rules.
 Since QUANGOs’ rule-making power is often very limited and given that expectations 
concerning their effi ciency are high, QUANGOs seem to be entitled to use any available tool 
that is likely to provide some security to users, and which is reliable, or is meant to shape 
their “policy”.164 Given the crisis of legitimacy experienced by Western states in general, 
QUANGOs are supposed to fi ll the gap between traditional bodies and users, that is, citizens, 
in a neutral and effi cient way. As a rule, to make the link between the general laws and the 
individual situations, there is the rule-making power or the regulatory power. If this tool is 
not given to QUANGOs, what can they do? One solution is to use instruments which are not 
formally recognized as ‘règlements’, but which are meant to guide public behaviour. How is 
such a power given and used? What are the limits of such a delegation? 
 Again, we come back to the question: “How will who hold whom accountable for those 
general rules?”
 In order to answer this question, we must fall back on the classical mechanisms of 
accountability, where the body that takes a decision should be held politically responsible 
before Parliament (in a representative democracy). On the one hand, QUANGOs are not 
systematically accountable to Parliament. Their accountability is often limited to annual 
reports. Even if some kind of accountability can be found in theory, practice is sometimes 
disappointing. On the other hand, in view of the constitutional principle of ministerial 
responsibility, the Executive might have to be accountable before Parliament for the rules 
issued by QUANGOs in some countries. However, once this principle is acknowledged, it is 
diffi cult to identify practical measures that completely ensure the independence of QUANGOs 
and make it possible for Ministers to have their say regarding the workings of QUANGOs. 
We are thus often faced with a “catch twenty-two” scenario in terms of the autonomy of the 
entity and ministerial responsibility: How can ministers remain accountable before Parliament 
for the acts of an entity that they may not or cannot steer?
 As a result of the lack of full political responsibility on the part of QUANGOs before 
Parliament (beyond an annual report and the approbation of the budget), the system is very 
reluctant to recognize the actual extent of the tasks performed by QUANGOs. Indeed, while 
a QUANGO may prepare nearly every single detail of the rules (règlement), the minister 
may only endorse it with a formal act called homologation, ratifi cation or approbation. The 
question then is whether the minister is actually able to assess all the aspects of his/her 
endorsement. When the only options are to approve, refuse or delay, what kind of control 
does the Minister actually exercise? Does the control not depend on the Minister’s trust 
164 But are they really supposed to develop and carry out their own policy?
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in the quality and expertise of the preparing entity? Or on the information provided by the 
QUANGO itself? How can the minister go beyond the specifi c interest of a sector, as assessed 
normally only on a technical basis by the QUANGO, to protect the general interest? A partial 
answer may be that other actors (another QUANGO whether or not on a consultative basis, 
lobby groups, trade unions) will react and act as a control mechanism. However, these forms 
of “informal” control generate a rather opaque framework to elaborate the rules, in a time 
when openness, transparency and debate are promoted. Besides, the minister might encounter 
an obstacle in doing so as the trust in the public has been placed in the hands of experts, 
striving to supplement the legitimacy of politics. 
 If a real decision is taken at the QUANGO level, the correlative responsibility needs to be 
transferred to them and clearly limited, and not remain at a ministerial level that does not have 
the required means to control QUANGOs effectively. Not proceeding to such a transfer may 
result in some kind of immunity for QUANGOs.
 The same question of the ability to steer or to direct QUANGOs exists when the minister 
is supposed to issue general directions or guidance to the entity without any say in specifi c 
cases. How can the minister have the necessary expertise to know what kind of directions 
are needed? In that case, once again, the minister depends on information provided by 
QUANGOs themselves.
66. One can go one step further. Even if those mechanisms are improved in such a way 
that they become more user-friendly (the user being the consumer or political bodies), a very 
important element should be kept in mind, in our opinion. Indeed, QUANGOs are more or 
less left in that unorganized framework in many countries,165 because it is often believed that 
their discretionary power is rather limited, that it remains technical and, presumably, without 
any political content.166 In other words, QUANGOs are assumed not to be involved in any 
kind of arbitration between competing interests.167
165 The very recent attempts to change this in countries like the Netherlands or France do not alter this 
statement.
166 The discretionary power of QUANGOs might be broader in very different aspects: in the general 
activities that the entity wants to fulfi l, in the interpretation of the rules, in the individual decision-making, in 
the guidelines, good practices and so on, advice and recommendations during the rule-making process or the 
legislative process. By such practices, the impact and the infl uence of QUANGOs might be very important. One 
can state that as such an infl uence does not fi t in with the traditional legal thoughts of many countries, those 
practices are not really subject to any kind of real accountability in most of the countries surveyed. 
167 For instance:
[…] même limité aux cas individuels, le pouvoir d’adopter des décisions ne peut être confi é à une agence que 
dans un domaine technique unique. Ce domaine […] ne doit laisser à l’agence aucune marge d’appréciation 
politique ou économique. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’agence ne peut être investie de sa mission que 
dans un seul domaine (underlined in the text), ‘spécialisé’ pour reprendre le terme du Livre blanc sur la 
gouvernance européenne; à défaut […], l’agence pourrait être conduite à effectuer des arbitrages, disposant 
ainsi d’un pouvoir d’appréciation qui ne pourrait relever que d’une autorité politique.
(French Senate report, supra note 4, p. 35-36.)
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 Such assumptions lead to a possible fragmentation of the decision-making power, a 
possibility outlined as follows: 
Il faut relever ensuite que la légitimité de l’Etat tient à ce qu’il demeure le garant de l’intérêt général. Cette 
fonction même de l’Etat cadre mal avec sa parcellisation, fût-elle justifi ée par le souci de mieux assurer 
certaines missions sectorielles. Elle suppose en effet de réaliser en permanence, à des degrés divers, mais 
qui peuvent être essentiels pour les équilibres du pays, des arbitrages entre des intérêts contradictoires, 
sectoriels ou non. Des mesures qui, par exemple, auront un impact économique positif sur tel ou tel secteur 
peuvent avoir des contreparties défavorables sur le plan social ou de l’environnement et des effets politiques 
déstabilisants, et inversement. Il revient alors à l’autorité publique de trouver le bon équilibre entre des 
exigences qui s’opposent et d’identifi er l’intérêt général dans la contradiction d’impératifs divers. Or la 
multiplication d’autorités indépendantes au sein même de l’administration rend sinon impossibles, du moins 
beaucoup plus complexes, ces arbitrages. Le Gouvernement n’a plus toutes les cartes en main et se prive de la 
capacité de jouer sur plusieurs registres, de renoncer à telle mesure pour mieux faire accepter telle autre ou de 
choisir telle solution, certes mal reçue par certains secteurs de la société, mais préservant l’intérêt général.
 En effet, par construction, la compétence d’une autorité administrative indépendante est spécialisée, 
sa mission très encadrée et son approche sectorielle, voire dans certains cas ‘monoculturelle’. Elle dispose 
des outils nécessaires pour élaborer la solution technique la plus adéquate au regard des intérêts qu’elle est 
en charge de protéger. En revanche, elle est très généralement dans l’impossibilité de faire entrer dans ses 
décisions des considérations qui excéderaient son domaine de compétence et de vérifi er que ses décisions 
s’intègrent harmonieusement dans le contexte économique, politique et social.168
The above quotation underlines the consequences of specialized decisions for the ‘general 
interest’. A so-called ‘technical’ decision is not always free of any political, economic or 
social considerations. Who says that something is technical? What are the interests behind 
those decisions? 
67. Another way of achieving some degree of control over QUANGOs’ decisions might 
be through “extended accountability”. It requires participation, consultation, reasoned 
decisions, explanations (in short “transparency”) with regard to bodies other than political 
ones (namely towards citizens or the parties concerned). Here, representative democracy is 
supplemented, though not replaced, by “participatory” democracy. However, some questions 
also remain:
How are those rules of participation formalized?• 
How can it be guaranteed that those new methods operate correctly?• 
What happens if those rule are not properly applied?• 
Moreover, several (maybe only theoretical?) questions are worth considering. Firstly, how 
is the general interest ensured in such a system? The central organ (Parliament) that should 
be the watchdog for the determination (if not the implementation) of the general interest is 
somehow bypassed. QUANGOs pursue only some kinds of specifi c competences, and do not 
have any power to go beyond this. 
 Secondly, what happens in the case of a confl ict between the rules or the system of law put 
in place by QUANGOs and their actors (with the participation of citizens) on the one hand, 
168 Rapport du Conseil d’Etat français, supra note 47, p. 375.
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and the general interest as it can be still determined by Parliament, on the other? A confl ict can 
arise in the determination of a rule. This results in a confl ict of legitimacy: How can a decision 
developed through participation be set aside by a decision defi ned through representation?
68. This can lead to additional disturbing questions since breaches of those rules cannot 
easily be established, can be interpreted in many ways, are not subject to clear control. Some 
alternative practices or an elaboration of the rule may be taking place in the absence of any 
clear rules of accountability. Such a result would be counterproductive and contradict the 
quest for the enhancement of citizens trust and for the credibility of QUANGOs. One would 
be faced with a breach of transparency, the opposite of the result sought. 
 One solution could be a formalisation of the developed practice through clear principles, 
modalities and control. Another solution could lie in a wider recognition of the rule-making 
power of QUANGOs. Before stressing the importance of procedural safeguards and citizen 
participation, the German report seems to be in favour of such a solution when it states:
There are several potent arguments in favour of the expansion of executive rule-making capacities. First of 
all, the performance of legislative duties by the administration would greatly relieve an often overwhelmed 
parliament. Secondly, decision-making costs within the executive branch would be lower than in the 
legislative branch. Thirdly, special agencies – like the Environmental Protection Agency, which employs 
scientists and technicians – are able to use their expertise […]; therefore, the delegation of certain tasks to 
agencies makes sense in highly specialised technical areas requiring advanced expertise […]. Also, it is 
advantageous that those agency decisions are based on purely technical evaluations and are not infl uenced by 
political considerations […]. Fourthly, a delegation of legislative powers to an administrative agency creates 
a useful fl exibility (e.g. in fi elds where technology is rapidly developing, such as in environmental controls), 
and it enables prompt (re)actions in situations when Parliament is not in session or the legislative process in 
Parliament is lagging.
69. While QUANGOs were supposed to be an alternative to some problems of the 
traditional State organisation, they have been established in many cases without a proper 
adaptation of the normative framework which surrounds them.
 As a result of the consciousness of the phenomenon, the powers granted to QUANGOs 
rarely encompass formal rule-making. There is no recognition that such powers require some 
checks and balances that are not yet there – neither on a theoretical nor a practical level. 
 However, as effi ciency, credibility and/or foreseeability are required from QUANGOs, 
they need instruments that satisfy the expectations of those who are regulated and guide 
public behaviour. As they rarely enjoy “rule-making” power, they issue instruments without 
any legal status (codes, guidelines, interpretations). And this can be the problem for the 
QUANGOs: For all the grey zones surrounding QUANGOs’ informal powers (their existence, 
forms, scope, sanctions, accountability), no clear rules are defi ned in many cases.
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